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Nostalgic Federalism
BYJUDITH OLANS BROWN* & PETER D. ENRICH**
The most provocative constitutional cases of the last several
terms have raised troubling challenges to what were thought to be
well-settled understandings of the appropriate constitutional roles of
state and federal governments.1 For the past half-century, it has been
almost a constitutional cliche that the federal government has
primary responsibility for the country's legislative program and has
broad authority both to regulate economic activity2 and to articulate
social norms? Today, however, the Court has cast serious doubts on
the scope of Congressional authority, particularly in areas that
impinge on state prerogatives, and in the process has revived old
questions about the appropriate federalism balance.
Read together, these cases portend a jurisprudential sea-change.
Not only do they re-envision the foundations of the federal-state
relationship, but they also signal a newly activist role for the courts in
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1. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898 (1997); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
2. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (2000) (upheld in
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)); National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §
151 (2000); Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 7 U.S.C. § 1281 (2000) (upheld in
Wiekard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)).
3. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, et seq. (2000); Migratory
Bird Treaty, 16 U.S.C. § 703, et seq. (2000); Child Support Recovery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 228
et seq. (2000).
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patrolling the boundaries of federal authority.4 Interestingly, this
restructuring is not based on constitutional text, but rather on the
Court's vision of "fundamental postulates implicit in the
constitutional design."' Neither scholars6 nor the lower courts1 have
yet resolved whether these cases simply raise the threshold that
Congress must cross before it can regulate in areas of state concern,
or rather fundamentally alter structural constitutional relationships,
not only between federal and state authority, but also between
judicial and legislative prerogatives.
We do not purport to answer that question. Indeed, if, as it
appears, we are in the midst of a structural revolution, the eventual
outcome may remain unsettled for some time. The deluge of
4. The Constitution "obviously" had drawn a line between the legitimate spheres of
federal and state authority. See DREW R. MCCoY, THE LAST OF THE FATHERs: JAMES
MADISON AND THE REPUBLICAN LEGACY 29 (1991). The more contentious issue
involved which institution was appropriate to decide which powers belonged to the federal
and which to the state governments. Id. at 68-73. For a defense of the courts' role in
policing the boundaries of the federal/state balance, see Stephen G. Calabresi, "A
Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez,
94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 799 (1995). For the contrary view see United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598, 694 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("the Founders' considered judgment that
politics, not judicial review, should mediate between state and national interests").
5. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,729 (1999).
6. With regard to the significance of Lopez, for example, compare Calabresi, supra
note 4, at 752 (stating that Lopez "marks a revolutionary and long overdue revival of the
doctrine that the federal government is one of limited and enumerated powers") with
Louis H. Pollak, Foreword: Symposium: Reflections on United States v. Lopez. 94 MICH.
L. REV. 533, 553 (1995) (saying that "there is less in Lopez than meets the eye") and
Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 643, 661 (suggesting
that Lopez, properly understood, "recede[s] into relative insignificance"). With regard to
Boerne, compare, for example, Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne v.
Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, (1998) (depicting Boerne as attacking "the core of
the constitutional structure for protecting liberty") with, for example, Ira C. Lupu, Why
the Congress Was Wrong and the Court Was Right - Reflections on City of Boerne v.
Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 793, 816-17 (1998) (suggesting that Boerne merely
reflects the Court's response to congressional over-reaching).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 268-71 (3d Cir. 2000) (Weis, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that United States v. Morrison requires invalidation of the Freedom of
Access to Clinic Entrances Act as exceeding Commerce Clause authority); Holman v.
Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 402 n.2 (7th Cir. 2000) (questioning whether the Equal Pay Act is a
valid exercise of Congress' Fourteenth Amendment powers); West v. Anne Arundel
County, 137 F.3d 752, 757-60 (4th Cir. 1998) (questioning whether the Fair Labor
Standards Act can be applied to county public safety employees in light of the Court's
recent Tenth Amendment cases); ACORN v. Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387 (5th Cir. 1996)
(holding provisions of the Lead Contamination Control Act violate Tenth Amendment
limits); William E. Thro, The Eleventh Amendment Revolution in the Lowcr Federal
Courts, 25 J. COLL. & UNIV. L. 501,505-06 (canvassing conflicting case law).
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inconsistent opinions from the lower federal' courts8 and the
continuing array of cases on the Court's docke leave no certainties
except for the fact of upheaval. In any case, we are primarily
interested, not in doctrinal prediction, but in exploring the yearnings
that lie beneath the Court's attempts to set constitutional limits to the
contemporary dominance of the federal voice and to carve out a
meaningful constitutional role for the states. In particular, we suspect
that the recent cases can best be understood as a reprise of the
themes previously enunciated in National League of Cities v. Usery'0
and its progeny." These decisions were motivated by concerns that
the balance of the federal-state relationship had gone awry and that
the political process could no longer be trusted to restore it. Today,
as then, the Court looks backwards to what it perceives as the
constitutional symmetry of nineteenth century notions of federalism,
where state and federal governments each occupied separate and
distinct "spheres" of regulatory authority.12 Both then and now, the
8. For example, compare Litman v. George Mason Univ., 5 F. Supp. 2d 366,373-74
(E.D. Va. 1998) (finding Title IX an invalid exercise of Congress' powers under section
five of the Fourteenth Amendment), affd on other grounds, 186 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 1999),
with Franks v. Kentucky School for the Deaf, 142 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding Title IX
a valid exercise of section five).
9. On top of the spate of significant federalism cases addressed during the 1999
Term, the Court again has several important cases on its current docket. The Court has
already heard oral arguments about whether the Americans with Disabilities Act validly
abrogates state sovereign immunity. See Garrett v. University of Alabama Bd. of
Trustees, 193 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. granted in part, 529 U.S. 1065 (2000).
Moreover, the Court reversed, on statutory grounds, the Seventh Circuit's holding that the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' assertion of control under the Clean Water Act over
intrastate waters serving as a habitat for migratory birds was a valid exercise of Commerce
Clause authority. See Solid Waste Agency, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers, 121 U.S. 675 (2001).
10. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (holding that the Commerce Clause did not empower
Congress to apply the Fair Labor Standards Act to the states).
11. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S.
742 (1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining Assoc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
12. Chief Justice Taney's language in a slavery case, Abelman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21
How.) 506, 516 (1859), is often cited as the apothegm of this dual federalism jurisprudence
"[T]he powers of the General Government, and of the State, although both exist and are
exercised within the same territorial limits, are yet separate and distinct sovereignties,
acting separately and independently of each other, within their respective spheres."
Abelman exemplified the notion that the slavery debate was more about
federalism than about human rights. Eleven years later, Taney used almost identical
language in Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113,126 (1870), upholding the right of
a state probate judge to refuse to pay a federal income tax. For an interesting
discussion of the contradictions in Taney's theories of federalism, see Roderick M.
Hills, The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes
Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MIcH. L. REv. 813, 847-52 (1998).
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Court's discomfort with federal aggrandizement draws it toward a
federalism that is more nostalgic than responsive to today's realities,
and which ultimately may prove unable to sustain the constitutional
pressures that the Court places upon it.
In Part I, we discuss the four major threads of case law that
comprise the Court's recent federalism opus and suggest that each of
them rests on the same idealized vision of how governmental
responsibilities should be (re)allocated. In Part II, we ask how
apocalyptic this new jurisprudence really is-by exploring how much
the existing case law has changed, and what further changes the
Court's vision portends. Finally, in Part III, we speculate about the
practical and institutional viability of the Court's emerging direction,
and suggest that the Court's nostalgic reliance on the metaphysics of
nineteenth century federalism is doomed to collapse under the weight
of twenty-first century realities.
I. Federalism Revived
A. The Cases
The story begins in its most natural place, with the constitutional
locus of state power, the Tenth Amendment.13 Before the Court's
decision in New York v. United States,4 the Tenth Amendment was
widely agreed to be a truism,5  simply memorializing the
understanding that those powers not delegated to the federal
government were preserved to the States. 6 However, in New York,
The corollary to separate spheres of institutional responsibility was the notion of
separate spheres of citizenship, of which Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
(1857), was the most heinous example. Even today, of course, one is both a citizen of the
United States and of the state where she resides. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489
(1999) (invalidating a California welfare law providing lesser benefits for newly arrived
residents as interfering with the new arrival's status both as a state citizen and as a citizen
of the United States).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people.").
14. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that the Tenth Amendment barred congressional
commandeering of state authority in the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act).
15. In Justice Stone's famous words: "The amendment states but a truism that all is
retained that has not been surrendered." United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 156-57 (holding that the Tenth Amendment is
"essentially a tautology").
16. This tautological view of the Tenth Amendment was briefly brought into question
some twenty years earlier by National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)
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the Court found within the Tenth Amendment a constitutional limit
on federal power, specifically precluding Congress from
"commandeering" the legislative authority of the states." A few
years later, the Court reinforced this reading in Printz v. United
States, ruling that certain interim provisions of the Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act unconstitutionally "dragooned" state law
enforcement officials into the administration of a federal regulatory
program. "
The next thread, arising from the holding of United States v.
Lopez9 that the Commerce Clause itself imposes limits on
congressional authority, represents a more dramatic, unexpected, and
ultimately far-reaching judicial initiative. At least since the New
Deal, ' the plenary nature ' of Commerce Clause authority has been
virtually indisputable.' But in striking down a law as prosaic as the
(holding that Commerce Clause did not empower Congress to enforce the Fair Labor
Standards Act against the states).
17. 505 U.S. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,
452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981) (upholding the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977 because it did not "commandeer" state mining regulation)). One commentator has
suggested that New York is a "symbiotic reading" of the Commerce Clause and the Tenth
Amendment, where the two together achieve "what the Tenth Amendment alone could
not." Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formulator for the
Future, 47 VAND. L. Rev. 1563,1581 (1994).
18. 521 U.S. 898, 928 (1997).
19. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power... to regulate
Commerce... among the several States.").
21. The Court essentially ceased using principles of federalism to strike Commerce
Clause legislation in 1937. See William Marshall, American Political Culture and the
Failures of Process Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 139, 140 n.7 (citing NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the National Labor Relations
Act of 1935 on grounds that Commerce Clause can be broadly used to protect interests of
interstate commerce)).
22. The notion that congressional power over commerce is plenary actually long
predates the New Deal. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,197 (1824):
If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to
specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several States, is vested in Congress as absolutely
as it would be in a single government, having in its constitution the same
restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found in the constitution of the
United States.
-Cf United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 609 ("The commerce power, we have often
observed, is plenary.").
23. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (holding
that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which prohibited racial discrimination in hotel lodging
was a valid exercise of Commerce Clause authority); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942) (upholding application of the Agricultural Adjustment Act to the decisions of a
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Gun Free School Zones Act, the Lopez Court deviated not only from
this well-settled doctrine but also from its own rhetoric of restraint.24
The third line of cases, those involving state sovereign immunity,
resonates with similar themes. In Seminole Tribe v. Florida,2 the
Court again departed from precedente to rule that the Commerce
Clause was no longer a valid source of authority for legislation
allowing states to be sued in federal court. Alden v. Maine foreclosed
the state court option as well, upholding the right of states not to be
sued in their own courts for violations of federal law as "a
fundamental aspect" of their pre-constitutional sovereignty.' To be
sure, Seminole Tribe was limited to Congress' authority to abrogate
state immunity when it was acting under its Article I powers,
specifically preserving federal power under the Fourteenth
Amendment "to intrude upon the province of the Eleventh
Amendment." That limitation may have suggested that Seminole
Tribe was nothing more than a post-Lopez alignment of the
Commerce Clause with the Eleventh Amendment. However, Alden
single farmer producing wheat to meet his own needs as falling within Congress' power to
regulate commerce); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the Fair
Labor Standards Act and holding that Commerce Clause authority extended to intrastate
activities which substantially affect interstate commerce).
24. See, e.g., North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 435 (1986) (deferring to
"the primary role of Congress in resolving conflicts between National and State
Governments"); Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546
(1985) (cautioning against open-ended role for "unelected federal judiciary to make
decisions").
25. 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress lacked authority under the Commerce
Clause to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act).
26. Seminole Tribe expressly overruled the Court's eight-year old decision in
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), notwithstanding the Court's asserted
disinclination to repudiate its recent precedents. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 66 (1996). See also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 190-91 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (cataloguing interests that counsel against rushing to overrule recent
precedent); Casey v. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pennsylvania, 505 U.S. 833, 864-69
(1992) (discussing how overruling a decision as recent as Roe would undermine the
legitimacy of the Court). Note that Union Gas was presaged by Parden v. Terminal
Railway, 377 U.S. 184 (1964), which itself was specifically overruled in College Savings
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666, 680
(1999), as an "ill-conceived" experiment.
27. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (holding that Congress could not
abrogate a state's sovereign immunity in its own courts to enforce the Fair Labor
Standards Act because "the States' immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the
sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution").
28. Seminole, 517 U.S. at 59.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
[Vol. 28:1
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and its companion cases' belie that narrow reading." A direct
outgrowth of New York and Printz, Alden warns of the danger in the
"power to press a state's own courts into Federal service and
ultimately to commandeer the entire political machinery of the state
against its will."'32 Alden and its companions and successors strongly
suggest that the abrogation issue is secondary to the Court's real
agenda, the resurrection of state autonomy.
3
The last chapter in the story involves Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment, hitherto a little used congressional power,.
but one nonetheless significantly constrained in City of Boerne v.
Flores35 and in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents.- Boerne struck
down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),37 a statute
passed in response to the Court's holding in Employment Division v.
Smith that neutral laws of general application which have an
incidental effect on the free exercise of religion do not violate the
the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign
state.").
30. See College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666 (1999) (holding that Florida's sovereign immunity was neither validly abrogated
by the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act nor voluntarily waived by the state's
activities in interstate commerce); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v.
College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (holding that neither Commerce Clause nor
Patent Clause provided Congress with authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity in
the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act).
31. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act's clear intent to abrogate states' sovereign immunity
was ineffective because the ADEA could not be sustained as an exercise of Congress'
authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment), strongly reinforces Alden's
broader approach.
32. 527 U.S. at 749.
33. See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 713 (state immunity is "a fundamental aspect of...
sovereignty"); College Savings Bank 527 U.S. at 686 ("sovereign immunity.., is a
constitutional doctrine that is meant to be both immutable by Congress and resistant to
trends"); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 78-81 (sovereign immunity "exists today by [the]
constitutional design" of federalism).
34. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. After a brief period of activity
soon after the Civil War Amendments were ratified, Congress did not expressly exercise
its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power again until the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000). The opinions on the constitutionality of that statute ushered in
the modem era of case law about congressional power under the Civil War Amendments.
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrTUTONAL LAW 920-64 (3d ed. 1999).
35. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
36. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
37. Boerne, 521 U.S. 507.
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First Amendment even in the absence of a compelling state interest.3
RFRA reimposed the pre-Smith "compelling state interest furthered
by least restrictive means" standard.39 The Boerne Court held that
Congress exceeded its Section Five power because RFRA did not
comport with the requirement of "congruence and proportionality"
between remedies enacted by Congress under Section Five and state
violations of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment.40
Boerne's distinction between impermissible substantive and
permissible remedial legislation echoes the infamous Civil Rights
Cases,4' and raises major impediments not only to congressional
authority to abdicate state sovereign immunity under Section Five but
also to federal legislative authority generally. Despite Boerne's
explicit recognition of Congress' "wide latitude"4 to enact
appropriate prophylactic legislation, the Kimel Court held that
Congress lacked the power under the Fourteenth Amendment to
apply the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to the states.4 3 The
Court, relying on its previous holdings that age was not a suspect
classification for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, barred any
federal legislation that prohibited more state conduct "than would
likely be held unconstitutional under the applicable equal protection,
rational basis standard."' Thus, perhaps the most augural import of
Boerne and Kimel is the Court's insistence on the limited nature of
Congress' legislative discretion and the importance of the judiciary as
the ultimate guardian of "separation of powers and the federal
balance. , 45
B. The Message - Usery Redux
Doctrinal niceties aside, all these cases clearly are grappling with
the same issues which have always been at the core of constitutional
inquiry, federalism, and separation of powers. But the particular
analyses the Court deploys are often surprising and perplexing. Our
38. 494 U.S. 872,878 (1990).
39. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb-1.
40. 521 U.S. at 520.
41. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The echo becomes tantamount to a holding
in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
42. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
43. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91.
44. Id. at 647.
45. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
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project is to decipher the yearnings which underlie these doctrinal
calculi, which we suggest are impelled by a nostalgia for a simpler era
in which federal authority was naturally contained within clear
constitutional boundaries.'
The Tenth Amendment cases represent cautious first steps on
this journey into the past. We use the word "cautious" advisedly.
The Tenth Amendment does at least contain the word "States,"'47 and,
over the years, there has been lively doctrinal and scholarly debate
about the amendment's scope and meaning.' In the wake of the
Court's most recent failure in National League of Cities v. Usery49 and
its progeny50 to create a robust Tenth Amendment jurisprudence that
could carve out constitutionally significant spheres of state autonomy,
New York and Printz propound a far more modest and circumscribed
doctrine.5' Rather than returning to an effort to sort out
constitutional roles according to the subject being regulated, 2 New
46. See, e.g., MORTON HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 17 (1992) ("Nineteenth-century political
thought was overwhelmingly dominated by categorical thinking-by clear, distinct, bright-
line classifications of legal phenomena."); FOREST MCDONALD, Novos ORDO
SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 278 (1985) (describing
the view that the newly formed United States involved divided sovereignties, and that
specific powers could be assigned to each).
47. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
U.S. CONST. amend. X. Professor Powell points out that to Thomas Jefferson the Tenth
Amendment was the "foundation" of the Constitution, reflecting his "fundamental
suspicion of national power." H. Jefferson Powell, Essay: The Principles of '98: An Essay
in Historical Retrieval, 80 VA. L. REV. 689,724 (1994).
48. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress
Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1995);
D. Bruce La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of Federalism Redux: Intergovernmental
Immunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 779, 1033-52 (1982);
Thomas H. Odom, The Tenth Amendment After Garcia: Process-Based Procedural
Protections, 135"U. PA. L. Rev. 1657 (1987); TRIBE, supra note 34, at 860-94.
49. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
50. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742
(1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining Assoc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
51. The foundations of this more moderate Tenth Amendment doctrine were laid in
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463-64 (1991) (finding that the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act did not apply to appointed state court judges absent a plain statement of
congressional intent to intrude on state authority over selection of "most important
officials") and FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742,762-65 (1982) (finding that Public Utility
Policies Act did not violate the Tenth Amendment, because insofar as Congress required
states to "consider" federal standards, it did not require states actually to adopt federal
law).
52. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851), marked the Court's
first attempt to sort out the implications of Chief Justice Marshall's distinction in Gibbons
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York and Printz merely invalidate congressional efforts to "impress"
the organs of state government into federal service.'
The constraints these cases impose are relatively unproblematic.
They limit the ways that Congress can pursue its ends, not the ends it
can pursue.' But while New York and Printz do not propound
significant shifts in the state-federal balance, we shouldn't
underestimate the seriousness of the signals these cases send. After
all, the distinction between the constitutional and unconstitutional
regulatory incentives in New York is somewhat evanescent,5 and yet
Justice O'Connor seizes the opportunity to write a lengthy
disquisition on federalism. 6 Additionally, the portions of the Brady
Act considered in Printz were nearly extinct by the time of the
Court's decision,57 yet Justice Scalia embraces the occasion to lecture
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 208-10 (1824) between the commerce power and the
subject to which it is being applied. The Cooley rule assigned Congress the power to
regulate those areas requiring a uniform national rule, leaving the states free to regulate
those subjects benefiting from a more diverse treatment. By the late nineteenth century,
however, the Court had turned to a more formal approach. See, e.g., United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (bemoaning the majority's return
to this analysis). Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 569-71 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (describing the demise of this approach); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S.
238 (1936) (distinguishing between mining and commerce); United States v. E.C. Knight
Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (similar); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888) (distinguishing
between manufacturing and commerce).
53. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922, 928 (1997) (holding that federal
government cannot "impress" state law enforcement officers into filling federal law
enforcement roles). The limitations on the Court's use of the Tenth Amendment are
underscored by its summary refusal to apply New York and Printz to invalidate the
Driver's Privacy Protection Act's restriction of a state's ability to disclose personal
information without the driver's consent. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 150 (2000).
Historically, to "impress" means to "levy or provide (a force) for military or naval
service," specifically to "compel men to serve in the Army or especially the Navy ." VII
OXFORD ENGLISH DICrIONARY 740 (2d ed. 1989). "Dragoon," the other memorable
verb in Printz, see 521 U.S. at 928, also has military origins: a "dragoon" is a carbine or
musket or a mounted infantryman; hence, as a verb, it means to persecute or oppress or
"force into a course of action by rigorous or harassing measures." Id at 1014.
54. Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 210 (1992) (White, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that the Court's decision would force Congress to clear "several additional
formalistic hurdles ... before achieving exactly the same objective").
55. Justices O'Connor and White are both advocates of state sovereignty. At bottom,
therefore, their debate in New York is really about how to best respect that sovereignty.
by Congressional ratification of collective state agreements (White) or by forbidding
federal directives to state officials (O'Connor). Professor Powell characterizes Justice
O'Connor's federalism as "one of process, not of substance." H. Jefferson Powell, The
Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 658 (1993).
56. 505 U.S. at 182-83 (offering the reader an "understanding of the fundamental
purpose served by our Government's federal structure").
57. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 902-03. The provisions invalidated by the Court's 1997
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about the dangers of federal aggrandizement.5' Still, the chief mystery
of these Tenth Amendment cases is not the new ground the Court is
breaking, but rather how cautiously the Court makes use of what
would appear to be the most available tool for its new federalism
agenda."
In Lopez, the scope of the Court's mission becomes clearer. By
denying congressional authority to enact a run-of-the-mill statute
criminalizing possession of guns in the vicinity of a school, the Court
takes a sharp turn away from half a century's settled understanding of
the scope of the Commerce Clause.6° Although the Court goes to
considerable lengths to disclaim any departure from its precedents,
61
Lopez (and its reaffirmation in United States v. Morrison) must be
read as a direct analytic attack on federal legislative authority.
At the heart of this assault is Lopez's oft repeated mantra that a
Constitution of enumerated powers "presupposes something not
enumerated." 6  From this premise, the Court sets out to define
concrete limits on the scope of "commerce," an enterprise the Court
had deferred to Congress for many decades. In the face of precedents
that forcefully demonstrate to the Court how fruitless such line
drawing had proven in the past, what now leads the Court back to
such a thankless task?
Justice Rehnquist's opinion answers that question with the
assertion that the Commerce Clause only warrants congressional
decision were interim procedures, which were to lapse in 1998, when the Brady Act's
federal instant background check system was to become operative. See Pub. L. 103-59 as
amended, Pub. L. 103-322,103 Stat. 2074.
58. See, e.g., 521 U.S. at 918-25, 931-33. Professor Hills questions the validity of the
historic foundations the Court enshrined in New York and Printz, arguing that the
tradition that Congress cannot impress state officials to do its bidding is based on the
Court's nationalistic contempt for state officials as untrustworthy and incompetent to
carry out federal responsibilities, and thus the support it offers for modem theories of
state autonomy is "deeply paradoxical." Hills, supra note 12 at 862, 878-94 (quote is at
888).
59. The Court's unanimous refusal in Reno v. Condon, 120 U.S. 666 (2000) to find a
Tenth Amendment violation only deepens the mystery.
60. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 625 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
("[T]he majority's holding runs contrary to modem Supreme Court cases that have upheld
congressional actions despite connections to interstate or foreign commerce that are less
significant than the effect of school violence."); id at 608 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the "inconsistency of [the majority's approach] with our rational basis
precedents from the last 50 years").
61. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560-61 (distinguishing facts of Lopez from those in
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)); id. at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasizing
that the Court's modem precedents "are not called in question by our decision").
62. Id. at 553,566-67 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)).
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action in matters which "substantially affect" interstate commerce. 61
But this assertion itself arises as a conclusory pronouncement' that
fits poorly with the constitutional history that Rehnquist's opinion
laboriously recounts. Perhaps what drives the Court is better
revealed by a recurring motif to which Rehnquist turns each time the
argument seems to be leading back to the Court's characteristic
deference to Congress. After describing the New Deal's Commerce
Clause revolution, the opinion concludes with Jones & Laughlin's
caution not to "effectually obliterate the distinction between what is
national and what is local and create a completely centralized
government."65 A bit later, it raises the spectre of extending federal
authority "in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education
where States historically have been sovereign."'  The opinion
concludes with the warning that a contrary approach "would require
us to conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does
not presuppose something not enumerated,... and that there never
will be a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly
local."'67
The concern that resonates throughout Lopez is that, without
limits on congressional authority, federal power threatens to
overwhelm the significant constitutional role reserved for the states.6
To the extent some may have thought Lopez a mere flash in the pan,
United States v. Morrison69 confirms the Court's determination to
63. Id. at 559.
64. The entire explanation offered by the Court follows:
Within this final category admittedly, our case law has not been clear whether an
activity must "affect" or "substantially affect" interstate commerce in order to be
within Congress' power to regulate it under the Commerce Clause. Compare
Preseault v. ICC, 494 U .S. 1, 17 (1990), with Wirtz, 392 U.S.183,196, n. 27 (1968)
(finding that the Court has never declared that "Congress may use a relatively
trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for broad general regulation of state or
private activities"). We conclude, consistent with the great weight of our case
law, that the proper test requires an analysis of whether the regulated activity
"substantially affects" interstate commerce.
Id.
65. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1,37 (1937)).
66. Id. at 564.
67. Id. at 567-68 (citations omitted).
68. These same concerns are prominent in Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion,
joined by Justice O'Connor, see 514 U.S. at 580, and animate Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
69. 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that the Violence Against Women Act exceeded the
reach of congressional power under the Commerce Clause).
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delimit federal authority. The Court's burden is to demarcate and
patrol the boundary between state and federal realms in order to
maintain the proper constitutional balance.70  A constrained
interpretation of Commerce Clause authority is simply a necessary
element in that enterprise.
In essence, this is the same project on which the Court had
embarked twenty years earlier in Usery." In Usery, the Court struck
down amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) that had
extended federal minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to
state and municipal employees.' There, the Court acknowledged that
the FLSA regulations were "undoubtedly within the scope" of the
commerce power,73 but congressional exercise of that power had
unconstitutionally interfered with the integrity of the states and their
"ability to function effectively in a federal system."'74 In other words,
the fatal constitutional flaw was not that the wages and hours of state
employees failed to affect interstate commerce, but rather that wage
and hour determinations with respect to those employees were so
"essential"5 to state sovereignty that they were beyond the reach of
federal regulatory authority.76
In Usery, the Court used a concept of state sovereignty grounded
in the Tenth Amendment as its primary tool, and therefore saw its
primary task as the delineation of the contours of state autonomy."
By contrast, in Lopez, the focus has shifted to narrowing the
definition of "enumerated" federal powers. But the basic ambition is
the same - to etch sharp boundaries between federal and state spheres
of authority. Our suggestion is that the Court's recent federalism
70. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-67. Ironically, the Court cites McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), as authority for the proposition that the Court's task is to limit
congressional authority to the powers enumerated in Article I.
71. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 841.
74. Id. at 843 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975)).
75. Id. at 845.
76. By so ruling, the Usery Court overruled the part of Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S.
183 (1968), which had upheld the extension of the FLSA to employees of state hospitals,
schools and institutions. Usery, 426 U.S. at 840. See also, id. at 845 ("We have repeatedly
recognized that there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government
which may not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress may lack an affirmative
grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it
from exercising the authority in that manner.")
77. See id. at 844 (holding that the Court's role is to define "the essential role of the
states in our federal system of government").
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cases, of which Lopez was the harbinger, represent a return to the
seductive challenge, first unveiled in Usery, of realigning federalism
by rediscovering the independent sovereign power of the states.
The central vision underlying all these cases depicts state and
federal sovereignty as occupying distinct and discrete spheres, a vision
that had its heyday in the late nineteenth century. Indeed, when the
Usery Court sought precedential support for this paradigm, it
resuscitated a trio of antique cases that had languished in doctrinal
and rhetorical obscurity.78 Texas v. White, the primary case the Usery
Court revived, involved the rights of non-Texans to collect on federal
bonds misused by the rebel government of Texas during the Civil
War. 9 In deciding whether Texas could sue in federal court for the
return of the bonds, the Court had to consider whether Texas had
ceased being a state when it had seceded in January 1861. Holding
that it had not, the Court invoked the "perpetuity and indissolubility
of the Union [which ] by no means implies the loss of distinct and
individual existence, or of the right of self-government by the
States."' In other words, the Constitution confers equal sovereignty
on the states and the national government: "[T]he Constitution, in all
its provisions looks to an indestructible Union, composed of
indestructible States."'" Usery turns back to this quaint language from
78. See iL at 844, (citing Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926)); Lane
County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1868); Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700
(1868). Justice Rehnquist's opinion seemed to place more importance on the federal law's
interference with state sovereignty than on the allegations that compliance would
significantly increase state costs. See Usery, 426 U.S. at 851. As Professor Tribe points
out, Justice Rehnquist was "careful to avoid" basing his opinion on this type of empirical
data. TRIBE, supra note 34, at 866 n.41.
79. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868). Historians Forest and Ellen McDonald tell the story
this way: Congressional radicals retreated from their position that the states which had
seceded be treated as "conquered provinces." In exchange for the votes of those states to
ratify the Fourteenth Amendment, they agreed that the Southern states had never left the
Union, an agreement confirmed by the Court in Texas v. White, despite the earlier
unchallenged creation of West Virginia in 1863, which had "dismembered" Virginia.
FOREST MCDONALD AND ELLEN SHAPIRO MCDONALD, REQUIEM: VARIATIONS ON
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY THEMES 200 (1988).
80. Texas, 74 U.S. at 725. The Court went on to explain:
Not only, therefore, can there be no loss of separate and independent autonomy
to the States, through their union under the Constitution, but it may be not
unreasonably said that the preservation of the States, and the maintenance of
their governments, are as much within the design and care of the Constitution as
the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National government.
81. Id. Accord Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523 (1926) (-[N]either
government may destroy the other nor curtail in any substantial manner the exercise of its
powers"); Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71, 76 (1868) ("[I]n many articles of the
Constitution the necessary existence of the States, and, within their proper spheres, the
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the ancien regime to reassert the constitutional centrality of state
autonomy, and the Court's more recent federalism cases have
referenced it repeatedly.' Underlying the Court's contemporary
efforts to set limits to what it sees as federal over-reaching is a wistful
longing for a simpler world where state and federal roles are readily
distinguished and clearly respected.
Naturally, the Usery Court started this effort with the Tenth
Amendment. But the Tenth Amendment proved an unsatisfactory
construct for delineating when congressional regulatory authority
trampled upon the sovereign integrity of the states. As every
constitutional law student now knows, the decade-long attempt to
craft the particular contours of the essence of state sovereignty did
not succeed.' As the Court ultimately acknowledged in Garcia v. San
independent authority of the States, is distinctly recognized.").
82. The Court had cited to Texas v. White with some frequency until 1937. See, e.g.,
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 598 (1937); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298
U.S. 238, 295 (1936). Thereafter, up until Usery, the majority of the Court cited White
only infrequently, and not for its notions of federalism. See United States v. Louisiana,
363 U.S. 121, 132 (1960) (citing White as part of a history of reconstruction era
constitutional evolution); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,226 (1962) (citing White on the issue
of state standing); CaleroToledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 672 (1974)
(quoting a lower court opinion citing White in assessing the status of Puerto Rico).
Following Usery, the Court has cited Texas v. White repeatedly in its federalism cases. See,
e.g., FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 777 (1982); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457
(1991); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898,919 (1997).
The chronology is similar with respect to Lane County v. Oregon. Before Usery,
the Court had not cited this case since 1938. Following Usery, the Court cited Lane in
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 676 n.32 (1978), FERC v.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765 (1982), EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 236 (1983), and
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 548 (1985). After
Garcia, Lane has continued to appear in, for example, Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. at
457; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992) and Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898 (1997).
83. In the years following Usery, the Court struggled with defining what areas are
"traditional" state functions, and what areas can be regulated by federal law. See, e.g.,
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (holding the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act applicable to states because states could work around several exceptions); FERC v.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (holding that the federal requirement that state utility
commissions adopt federal rules regarding energy regulation does not intrude on state
regulation where Congress could have simply preempted state law); United
Transportation Union v. Long Island Railroad, Co., 455 U.S. 678 (1982) (holding that
commuter rail service provided by a state-owned railroad was not a traditional state
governmental function shielded from federal regulation); Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (holding that federal regulation of strip-mining did not
interfere with state's interest in land use planning).
Despite the Court's efforts to clarify such key concepts as whether "particular
governmental functions [were] 'integral' or 'traditional' to states, Garcia v. San Antonio
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Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,' the Usery formulation that
"States qua States" were immune from federal regulation was
"unsound in principle and unworkable in practice. '
Still, as an attempt to reassert the Court's primacy in making
constitutional sense of a world run amok and in resurrecting the
notion of a sacrosanct state sphere, Usery marked a critical turning
point. Garcia was widely viewed as a rejection of these ambitions,'
but in retrospect it was but a tactical retreat.' As Justice Rehnqulst
observed in his dissent, the constitutional protection of a sphere of
state autonomy was "a principle that will, I am confident, in time
again command the support of a majority of this Court."' 9
It was the Court's inability to reduce the metaphysical notion of
"States as States" to accessible doctrine which ultimately led in Lopez
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528,547 (1985), the circuit courts' efforts to apply
these concepts underscored their problematic character. Regulation of ambulatory
services, licensing of drivers, and operation of municipal airports were all held to be
traditional state functions by various Circuits, while regulation of traffic on public roads,
operation of mental health facilities and provision of in-home domestic services to aged
and handicapped persons were held to fall outside of the protection created by Usery. See
generally id. at 538 (reviewing circuit court cases).
84. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
85. Usery, 426 U.S. at 847 (1976).
86. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546-47. See also id. at 567 (characterizing Usery's approach as
"impracticable and doctrinally barren").
87. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority:
The Demise of a Misguided Doctrine, 99 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1985); Bernard Schwartz,
National League of Cities Again-R.LP. or a Ghost That Still Walks, 54 FORDHAM L.
RV. 141 (1985); Thomas H. Odom, The Tenth Amendment After Garcia: Process-Based
Procedural Protections, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1657 (1987).
88. Our point is this: Although Garcia overruled Usery doctrinally, it did not end the
debate over whether the federal political process sufficiently safeguarded the states or
whether judicial intervention was needed to do so. Writing for the majority in Garcia,
Justice Blackmun lauded the efficacy of the political process in shielding the states from
unduly burdensome federal legislation: "[Tlhe model of democratic decision making the
[Usery] Court... identified underestimated, in our view, the solicitude of the national
political process for the continued vitality of the States." Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556. For a
succinct analysis of the "process model" of federalism, see Deborah Jones Merritt, supra
note 17 at 1567. Compare Hills, supra note 12 at 820 (characterizing political process
theories as theories of judicial review, not federalism). Dissenting, Justice Powel charged
the majority with ignoring its constitutional responsibilities: "The fact that Congress
generally does not transgress constitutional limits on its power to reach state activities
does not make judicial review any less necessary to rectify the cases in which it does do
so." Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556. With equal passion in his Usery dissent, Justice Brennan
accused the majority of usurping the legislative role, labeling its opinion "a transparent
cover for invalidating a congressional judgment with which they disagree." Usery, 426
U.S. at 867.
89. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580.
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to the other side of the federal-state equation. The enumeration of
congressional powers in Article I provides the alternative vehicle
upon which to predicate judicially enforceable boundaries to what the
Court fears is becoming boundless federal authority.9 Undoubtedly,
it is the sorry history of the Court's struggles to spell out Usery's
premise that informs the Court's cautious approach to the Tenth
Amendment in its more recent case law.9
The sovereign immunity cases resonate with identical themes.
Indeed, Justice Kennedy commands in Alden that Congress "accord
the states the esteem due them as joint participants in a federal
system, one beginning with the premise of sovereignty in both the
central government and the separate States. '
It is not our purpose to plumb the depths of the often
impenetrable complexities of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence
and sovereign immunity doctrine.93 Instead, we want to suggest that
Seminole Tribe,94 Alden,9 5 and their companions96 are more properly
understood as part of the Court's newly revived effort to patrol the
boundaries between state and federal roles. Seminole Tribe, when it
first appeared, seemed nothing more than a new wrinkle on the
Court's tortuous Eleventh Amendment exercise,' clarifying that
90. While the Commerce Clause is, of course, only one source of federal legislative
authority, alongside, inter alia, the Spending Clause and Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it has been perhaps the most versatile source of post-New Deal federal
authority, and the one least restrained by the case law. Prior to Lopez, the Court had not
struck down a single law as exceeding Commerce Clause authority in over fifty years. See
Marshall, supra note 21, at 139-40.
91. For the most recent and clearest example of the Court's caution in deploying
Tenth Amendment restrictions on congressional enactments, see Reno v. Condon, 528
U.S. 141 (2000). Despite its restrained use of Tenth Amendment analysis, the Court's
rhetoric in its Tenth Amendment cases still echoes the same themes, as when Justice
Scalia excoriates Congress for interfering with "our constitutional system of dual
sovereignty" in Printz, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
92. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,758 (1989).
93. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the
Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61 (1984); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, What is Eleventh
Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683 (1997); William Burnham, "Beam Me Up,
There's No Intelligent Life Here?": A Dialogue on the Eleventh Amendment with Lawyers
from Mars, 75 NEB. L. REv. 551 (1996).
94. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
95. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
96. See College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666 (1999); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savings
Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
97. See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception", 110
HARV. L. REv. 102, 103 (1996) ("despite [its] symbolic statement to the contrary, little has
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Congress, acting under its Article I powers, could not endow the
federal courts with jurisdiction over suits against the states. ' Only
when viewed through the subsequent lens of Alden does it become
clear that the Eleventh Amendment was secondary to the Court's
renewed fascination with separate-spheres federalism. Indeed, the
Court in Alden essentially dismissed the Eleventh Amendment as
little more than a historical footnote to what it sees as the natural
immunity of states from federal dictates." In discovering this
fundamental principle, the majority was singularly untroubled by the
absence of any textual anchor." Indeed, the tone of the majority's
opinion was almost mystical in its obeisance to a vision of "dual
sovereignty" in which the states are coequals of the federal power:
The federal system... reserves to [the States] a substantial
proportion of the Nation's primary sovereignty.... The States
"form distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, no
more subject, within their respective spheres, to the general
authority than the general authority is subject to them, within
its own sphere."' '1
The Court sees Alden as a logical outgrowth, not only of
Seminole Tribe, but of its emerging federalism jurisprudence. Viewed
in this light, it is no surprise that the majority paints its holding as of a
piece with New York and Printz, characterizing the FLSA as
"commandeering" the state courts in the same way that the earlier
cases "impressed" the state legislative and executive branches,"°
notwithstanding the concession that Congress retains the authority,
when acting under the Reconstruction Amendments, to open the
state courts to federal claims.1" Indeed, although the Court connects
Alden to New York and Printz, its language harks back to Usery, with
changed after the Seminole Tribe decision").
98. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54.
99. Alden, 527 U.S. at 713 ("the sovereign immunity of the States neither derives
from nor is limited by the terms of the Eleventh Amendment").
100. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 728-30; id. at 760-61 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting the
irrelevance of the constitutional text to the majority's opinion). See also Kime!, 528 U.S.
at 97 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the absence of textual support for the majority's
sovereign immunity doctrine); Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the
Privileges and Immunities Revival Portend the Future - or Reveal the Structure of the
Present?, 113 HARv. L. REv. 110 (1999) (noting the Court's growing reliance on
"structural inference" rather than "explicit text").
101. Alden, 527 U.S. at 714 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison)).
102. Compare Alden, 527 U.S. at 749 ("commandeer") with Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 922, 928 (1997) ("impress") and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 176
(1992) ("commandeer").
103. Alden, 527 U.S. at 730-32.
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its invocation of the Tenth Amendment's assurances "regarding the
constitutional role of the States as sovereign entities,"" and its
citations again draw on its nineteenth century "separate spheres"
opinions." The crux of separate spheres federalism, after all, is that
there is a clear constitutional demarcation between state and federal
prerogatives °6 and that the "residuary and inviolable sovereignty""
of the states depends on respect for this boundary. State sovereign
immunity is but a corollary to this principle.
Alden thus achieves the hoped for return to Usery of Chief
Justice Rehnquist's Garcia dissent.' Alden overrules Garcia,
practically if not doctrinally."° After all, the political process relied
on in Garcia to protect the states from federal meddling had failed in
Alden. Through the building blocks of sovereign immunity, the Alden
Court rehabilitates the constitutional Chinese wall around the
separate sphere of state autonomy.
Together, Lopez and the Court's sovereign immunity cases
significantly constrain the reach of the federal regulatory sphere. But
104. 1& at 713-14.
105. See, e.g., id. at 723 (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)); id. at 746 (citing a
string of antique cases redolent with the metaphysics of sovereignty); id. at 751 (citing
Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1883)).
106. A more contemporary, albeit chronologically baffling, image refers to the
framers' intent to "split the atom of sovereignty" into "two political capacities, one state
and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other." See U.S. Term Limits, Inc.
v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring), cited in Alden, 527 U.S. at
751.
107. THE FEDERALIST No. 39 at 245 (James Madison) (quoted in Printz, 521 U.S. at
919 and in Alden, 527 U.S. at 714). The Federalist Papers were, of course, advocacy
documents, "designed to convert doubters" of the wisdom of the new constitution.
STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKrrRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 22 (1993).
Nonetheless, they do represent the range of abstract values shared by the Constitution's
supporters, id., and thus, not surprisingly, their parsing has become part of the common
currency of the Court's federalism debates. But, also not surprising are the disparate
readings given to the same language. Compare, for example, the various interpretations in
Alden of THE FEDERALIST No. 39, in which Madison wrote that the system of
government created by the constitution was partly national and partly federal. Writing for
the majority, Justice Kennedy cites THE FEDERALIST No. 39 to note that the Constitution
reserves "to [the States] a substantial portion of the Nation's primary sovereignty,
together with the dignity and essential attributes inhering in that status." Alden, 527 U.S.
at 714. Justice Souter in dissent disagrees: "[M]atters subject to federal law are within the
federal sphere, and so the States are subject to the general authority where such matters
are concerned." Id. at 800 n.32.
108. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580.
109. Indeed, Alden, without reinstating Usery's Tenth Amendment holding, achieves
much the same effect, rendering the FLSA, for all practical purposes, unenforceable in
cases involving state employees.
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the limits they impose apply only to Congress' Article I powers.
Lopez, of course, only impacts Congress' Commerce Clause powers,
and both Alden and Seminole Tribe specifically acknowledge that
Congress retains the authority, when acting under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment, to subject the states to the jurisdiction of
the federal and state courts.11 As Justice Kennedy observes, there
can be little question that the Reconstruction Amendments shifted
the federalism balance toward a dominant federal role when
questions of citizenship rights were involved."' But the result of this
admission, together with Lopez's restrictive reading of the Commerce
Clause, is to place extraordinary new stresses on Section Five. The
Court's response in Boerne, Kimel, and Morrison is to impose parallel
constraints in this area as well.
Until now, the Court had been able largely to fudge the
parameters of Section Five," because a vigorous Commerce Clause
obviated reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment as a source of
congressional authority and because both clauses supported similar
invocations of judicial enforcement powers."' But, in the wake of
110. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n.15 (1996) (noting that Congress'
authority to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment
is undisputed); Alden, 527 U.S. at 756 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 4456 (1976))
("Congress may authorize private suits against nonconsenting States pursuant to its § 5
enforcement power").
111. See Alden, 572 U.S. at 756.
112. The delineation of the breadth of the enforcement power was never precise.
According to South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the power extended beyond forbidding
violations "in general terms, leaving specific remedies to the courts." 383 U.S. 301, 327
(1966). On the other hand, despite intimations to the contrary in Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641,651 (1966) (holding that Section Five is a "positive grant of legislative power
authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation
is needed to secure the guarantees of the 14th Amendment"), Congress did not have the
right to share the interpretive power with the Court and to have the Court defer to its
judgment. William W. Van Alstyne, The Failure of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, DUKE L.J. 291,312-14,320 (1996). Nor
did the various opinions, none commanding a majority, in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112
(1970), about congressional power to lower the voting age in both state and federal
elections clarify matters. Professor Tribe describes Oregon v. Mitchell as "quite literally
incomprehensible." LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 342 (2d ed.
1988).
113. For example, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the first omnibus approach to race
discrimination in almost one hundred years, was enacted under the Commerce Clause and
not under Section Five. Despite the obvious connection between race and the Fourteenth
Amendment, the doctrinal limitations of that Amendment strongly influenced the choice
of the commerce power. For interesting analyses of the moral implications of that choice,
see Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 279-286 (1964) (Douglas, J.,
concurring); GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
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Lopez and Seminole Tribe, the lower courts have been deluged with
cases questioning whether Section Five can sustain Congress'
adoption of a wide array of legislation."' Kimel v. Florida Bd. of
Regents, the first of these cases to reach the Supreme Court, suggests
that at least in the absence of legislation directed at suspect or quasi-
suspect classifications, Congress' power is scarcely more extensive
under Section Five than it is under Article 1.115
But Kimel merely reinforces the significant evisceration of
Section Five set forth in City of Boerne v. Flores. According to
Boerne, under Section Five, Congress can only pass statutes that
remedy "established" or "legitimate" violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment's substantive first section."' The Court is clear that
201-203 (13th ed. 1997) and Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to
Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585, 592 (1975). And, of course, since 1937
the Spending Clause has been available as another broad grant of congressional power.
See, eg., Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (upholding the Social Security
Act).
114. See, e.g., Kazrnier v. Widmann, 225 F.3d 519 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding the state
agency immune from suit under Family and Medical Leave Act because it was not validly
enacted pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment); Litman v. George
Mason University, 186 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that Title IX of the 1972
Education Amendments contained an unambiguous waiver of Eleventh Amendment
immunity); In re NVR Homes, 189 F.3d 442 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding the Eleventh
Amendment bars a debtor's motion under the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
because Bankruptcy Code was not validly enacted pursuant to Fourteenth Amendment);
Garrett v. University of Alabama, 193 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. granted in part 529
U.S. 1065 (2000) (finding that the Americans with Disabilities Act abrogates state
sovereign immunity and is a valid exercise of Congress' Fourteenth Amendment authority,
but holding that the Family Medical Leave Act was not within the authority of Congress
under the Fourteenth Amendment).
115. 528 U.S. 62, 80 (2000). Although predicated on a different doctrinal foundation,
Morrison provides further evidence of the limited reach of Section Five. 529 U.S. 598,
621-24 (2000) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power does not reach
purely private conduct).
116. 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997). This echoes, of course, the major import of the Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883), that since Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires state action, Congress cannot enact legislation under Section Five which regulates
private conduct, a holding which Morrison appears to revitalize. This analysis mirrors
some of the inconsistent pre-Boerne issues involving the constitutional sufficiency under
Amendments 13-15 of the nexus between the substantive provisions in each amendment's
first section and the scope of congressional authority to implement those mandates. For
example, since Section One of the Thirteenth Amendment does not apply to gender,
legislation enacted under Section Two, such as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982, may not cover
gender claims. See, e.g., Bobo v. FIT, Continental Baking Co., 662 F.2d 340, 345 (5th Cir.
1981). But Section One does not cover religion and national origin either, yet the
Supreme Court has held that both classifications are cognizable under sections 1981 and
1982. See Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987); Shaare Tefila
Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617 (1987). One of the critical points at issue in the
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judicially recognized violations meet this standard, but whether
congressionally identified violations can do so is considerably more
problematic.' (Kimel strongly suggests that they do not.) Read
narrowly, Boerne could be seen to focus specifically on congressional
enactments that intrude on "States' traditional prerogatives and
general authority,""' a reading which links Boerne with the "separate
spheres" imagery of Alden, New York, and Printz. Morrison,
however, makes clear that the Court's purpose is to sharply curtail
Congress' Section Five authority in order "to prevent the Fourteenth
Amendment from obliterating the Framers' carefully crafted balance
of power between the States and the National Government.". 9 Read
this way, Boerne is the Fourteenth Amendment analogue of Lopez, a
direct attack on the scope of federal legislative authority.
What is most remarkable about Boerne is its insistence on
judicial prerogatives. Justice Kennedy's opinion repeatedly castigates
Congress for passing a statute directly overturning the holding of the
Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith'20 and
resonates with his indignation at the perceived legislative effrontery."
Justice Kennedy's reaction reflects the institutional concerns raised
by RFRA that Congress was overstepping its appropriate role and
that the Court needed to monitor congressional activity more
various opinions in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993), was
the extent to which Section One of the Thirteenth Amendment and Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment circumscribed the coverage of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3).
117. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 597, 519 (1997). For interesting theories,
see, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Congressional Power to Expand Judicial Definitions of the
Substantive Terms of the Civil War Amendments, 67 MINN. L. REV. 299 (1982) (finding
that Congress may provide remedies for violations of rights arguably protected by the
Constitution); William Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal
Protection, 27 STAN. L. RaV. 603 (1975) (distinguishing between decisions about contents
of rights and decisions about federalism); Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court 1965 Term
Foreword. Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 91 (1966) (arguing Congressional superiority as fact-finder).
118. 521 U.S. at 534.
119. 529 U.S. 619-20.
120. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause does not relieve an
individual engaging in sacramental use of peyote from the sanctions of a generally
applicable law penalizing the use of peyote).
121. See, e.g., Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 ("RFRA was designed to control cases and
controversies ... but as the provisions of the federal statute here invoked are beyond
congressional authority, it is this Court's precedent, not RFRA, which must control."); id.
at 532. (RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it
cannot be understood as responsive to... unconstitutional behavior... [RFRA]'s
sweeping coverage ensures its intrusion at every level of government, displacing laws and
prohibiting official actions of almost every description and regardless of subject matter.").
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closely."z  Since Marbury v. Madison," it has not been seriously
debated that the Court's core function was to rule on legislative
authority to enact statutes. Over the years, the debate has been about
the propriety of the Court's second guessing of the substantive
wisdom of legislation." In Boerne, Kimel, and Morrison, it is often
hard to tell which task the Court is pursuing. What is clear is that the
Court is determined to (re)assert its institutional authority. These are
cases as much about separation of powers as about federalism.
In fact, separation of powers concerns play a central, if
occasionally implicit, role throughout the cases we have been
discussing. The Lopez majority asserts its responsibility to perform
an "independent evaluation" of the nexus between congressional
activity and interstate commerce," in light of the judiciary's duty "to
say what the law is."'6 In addition, the Morrison Court rejects not
only the exhaustive legislative findings documenting that nexus, but
also the analytic method Congress used to make them,1 reiterating
the Court's role as the Constitution's "ultimate expositor."' " In
Printz, Justice Scalia warns that a congressional demand that state
officials administer federal programs threatens "the separation and
equilibration of powers between the three branches of the Federal
Government itself."29
122. See id. at 519 (holding that RFRA was beyond the scope of Congress'
enforcement power under Section Five because "[legislation which alters the meaning of
the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not
enforce a Constitutional right by changing what the right is.").
123. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
124. The issue is, of course, the scope of Chief Justice Marshall's famous assertion in
Marbury that "[ijt is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is." 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177-78. It is not debatable that the Court will not
defer when the question includes the scope of congressional authority. Rather, the so-
called "counter majoritarian difficulty," identified by ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962), arises in connection with the legitimacy of a
broader exercise of judicial power, one which appears to usurp the decisions of the
popularly elected legislature. See generally id. (arguing that since judicial review is
antidemocratic it should be used sparingly) and LAURENCE TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL
CHOICES (1985) (pointing out that judges cannot escape making substantive choices). In
the Boerne context, the question becomes whether Marbury permits interpretations of the
Constitution which are different from those made by the Court.
125. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 559,562 (1994).
126. Id. at 566 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,177 (1803)).
127. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 614-15 (2000).
128. 1& at 616 n.7.
129. Printz, 521 U.S. at 922. Here apparently the concern is that the use of state
officials reduces the power of the president to execute federal laws.
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In counterpoint, a series of impassioned dissents by Justice
Stevens chastises the Court for continually overstepping its
constitutional role. For example, he castigates the Printz majority for
substituting its judgment for that of "the elected representatives of
the people,"'" when there is nothing in the record to suggest that the
"political safeguards of federalism identified in Garcia need [to] be
supplemented by a [judicially crafted] rule, grounded in neither
constitutional history nor text."13' This theme is reprised in his Kimel
dissent, where he argues that the Framers intended the Constitution's
structure (and not the judiciary) to safeguard the interests of the
states from undue federal interference. 32 Most vivid is his Seminole
Tribe dissent protesting "the shocking character of the majority's
affront to a coequal branch of our Government." '133
The convergence of the Court's nostalgic federalism and
separation of powers concerns should be no surprise. Indeed, the
cases between Usery and Garcia evinced a similar recurring worry
that the Court had abdicated its responsibility for maintaining an
appropriate federal-state balance."3 A view of federalism predicated
upon a presumed natural boundary between the proper spheres of
state and federal authority inevitably invites a prescient diviner of the
precise location of that boundary. The Court, convinced that the
130. Id. at 940 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 957 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Education
Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, Justice Stevens condemns the "aggressive" nature
of the Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence, berating the majority for championing
rights which "the States themselves did not express any particular desire in possessing."
527 U.S. 666, 693 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
133. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 78 (Stevens, J., dissenting). At times, even Justice
Souter's more measured dissent reveals the depths of his concern with the majority's
"reach(ing) so far as to declare that the plain text of the Constitution is subordinate to
judicially discoverable principles untethered to any written provision." Id. at 167 (Souter,
J., dissenting). Several scholars have alluded to the separation of powers themes that
undergird the case law. See, e.g., Laura M. Herpers, State Sovereign Immunin,: Myth or
Reality After Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 1005, 1053-55
(1997) (adopting the criticisms from the Stevens and Souter dissents); H. Geoffrey
Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Search for a Judicially Enforceable Federalism, 83 MINN. L.
REV. 849, 884 (1999) (referring to the "unexpressed... but... quite plain" judicial belief
in New York and Printz in the Court's "primary responsibility for both defining and
protecting that system of dual sovereignty").
134. See, e.g., FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 790-91 (1982) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting and concurring) (accusing the Court of disregarding its role of patrolling the
federal and state boundaries); Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528, 566-67 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for abandoning proper
judicial role in enforcing federalism limits).
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boundary is real, feels compelled to step in to defend it. As in
Lochner,35 the Court is drawn into an activist role by its belief that
only it can see critical natural distinctions that the political branches
of government are unable to recognize or respect as fully as the Court
would have them do. Perhaps, as Justice Souter suggests in his
Seminole Tribe dissent, the Court "seems to be going Lochner one
better."1 6
H. Obstacle Course or Apocalypse?
The recent cases leave no doubt about the transformation in the
Court's images - of both federalism and its role as its enforcer. What
is far less clear is the practical impact of these abstractions. In one
view, the nostalgic vision permeating the new cases creates little more
than a series of procedural impediments to congressional action. A
more apocalyptic perspective suggests that the scope of Congress'
authority has been dramatically curtailed. It is surely too early for
commentators37 or courts118 to attempt a definitive resolution of this
question, but it is not too soon to identify the basic patterns of the
debate.
A. How Far Have We Come?
Consider, first, the Commerce Clause. Does Lopez substantially
alter the contours of this most expansive source of federal legislative
authority? Or does it merely change the standards for judicial review
of congressional action, thereby imposing a new burden on Congress
to justify and explain its choices? A couple of points seem relatively
clear. First, Lopez surely precludes Congress from using the
Commerce Clause to bootstrap a range of largely hortatory, non-
commercial measures. Second, Lopez underscores the critical
importance of congressional findings about the nexus between its
substantive enactments and its Commerce Clause authority to act.
But beyond these observations, the impact of Lopez on congressional
actions that bear less than direct connections to commerce remains
considerably more complex and problematic.
At the least, Lopez appears to curtail Congress' ability to use its
Commerce Clause power to declaim upon any and every topic of
135. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down New York's regulation of bakery working hours
as an arbitrary interference with freedom of contract).
136. 517 U.S. at 166 (Souter, J., dissenting).
137. See supra notes 6,48, 87, 93.
138. See supra notes 7,8,114.
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current political and social concern, in the absence of a suitably
determinate connection between the topic of concern and national
economic life. The Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA") is but one
recent example of the congressional predilection for pious
pronouncements which may not survive in a post-Lopez world.
DOMA, which was enacted in 1996, sets forth restrictive federal
definitions of "marriage" and "spouse": "the word 'marriage' means
only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and
wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex
who is a husband or a wife.,
139
In federalizing these definitions, Congress is acting both as
regulator and as preacher. The regulatory aspect, which impacts
those areas of federal law, such as the Internal Revenue Code,'40
which incorporate family law concepts, rests on a relatively
straightforward Spending Clause foundation.14' Much more
problematic is the hortatory aspect. Before Lopez, one could imagine
an argument that the Commerce Clause, in an age of a unified
national economy and political system, empowers Congress to pass
aspirational legislation on virtually any aspect of human behavior
including those at the core of traditional state responsibility.42 But
Lopez clearly changes the rules of this game. A statute that addresses
the gender of one's life partner clearly fails the Lopez test of
"economic activity substantially affect[ing] interstate commerce. '
The mere fact that marital status has clear economic consequences is
no longer sufficient, especially in the context of an area traditionally
reserved to the states. Similarly, the Lopez statute" itself, as well as
139. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1994 Supp. IV 1998). Notice that this definition is limited to federal
concerns. Query whether this limitation will suffice to save the statute, particularly after
Morrison's concern about federal interference with areas of traditional state regulatory
authority.
140. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 1 (1994 Supp. IV 1998) (determining federal income tax rates
by marital status); 42 U.S.C. § 416 (1994) (relying on marital status to define benefits
under Social Security).
141. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power... to pay the Debts
and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.").
142. Indeed, this was sometimes the case even before the New Deal expansion of
Commerce Clause authority. See, e.g., Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (affirming
congressional authority to prohibit interstate transport of lottery tickets); Hoke v. United
States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (upholding Mann Act's prohibition of transporting women in
interstate commerce for immoral purposes). For post-New Deal case law, see. e.g., Heart
of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding federal public
accommodations law).
143. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
144. 18 U.S.C. 922(q)(1)(a) (making it a federal offense "for any individual knowingly
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the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA") struck down in
Morrison,141 may best be seen as further examples of federal pious
pronouncements, designed more to express congressional sentiment
than to regulate economically significant conduct.1"
For the large remainder of congressional enactments which bear
a more plausible nexus to commerce, the clear message of Lopez is
that the Court will no longer take that nexus for granted. Returning
to an approach last seen before the New Deal,47 the Lopez Court
assigns a significant role in its analysis to the presence or absence of
legislative findings. In fact, on one reading, Congress' mistake in the
Gun Free School Zones Act was simply its failure to provide such
findings." Of course, the language of Lopez concerning findings is
carefully couched as encouragement, not requirement,'49 but it seems
obvious that, in future cases, a careful legislator would be wise to
make findings."'
Still, two questions remain. First, precisely how should she do
so? Are hearings necessary? How painstaking a factual record is
required? To what extent does the statutory language have to mirror
the record of the legislative process? Second, what do the findings
to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to
believe, is a school zone.). Cf Morrison, 529 U.S. 610 ("But a fair reading of Lopez shows
that the noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct at issue was central to our decision
in that case.").
145. See Morrison, 529 U.S. 613 (invalidating 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c), which created a
federal cause of action for gender-motivated violent crimes, because "[g]ender-motivated
crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity"). Cf. Rep. No.
103-138, at 38 (characterizing goals of VAWA as "both symbolic and practical").
146. For another example, consider legislation passed by the House of Representatives
last year, H.R. 2260, to withhold federal recognition of any state law (like one enacted in
Oregon) that permits assisted suicide or euthanasia. See 68 U.S.L.W. 2270 (Nov. 9,1999).
147. See, e.g., Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (finding
the record insufficient to show the connection between a local wholesale poultry
slaughterer and the interstate poultry business); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238
(1936) (refusing to defer to legislative findings about the impact of labor unrest on
interstate commerce).
148. This appears to be the hopeful understanding of the Lopez majority that underlies
Justice Breyer's dissent, which attempts to provide the findings that Congress neglected to
establish. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 618-619 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
149. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63. Cf. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 ("But the existence of
Congressional findings is not sufficient by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of the
Commerce Clause legislation.").
150. Is this now an absolute requirement? Would the Court's separation of powers
concerns now necessitate congressional finding to justify even a statute regulating, for
example, aviation? Note the curious absence of findings or of any discussion about them,
in Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
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have to be about? Can Congress simply recite that the regulated
activity is commercial or that it has a substantial effect on commerce,
or must it memorialize the specific steps that link the activity to
interstate economic activity? 5'
The difficulties do not end here. Even if the substance of the
findings is exactly what the Court would want, how strictly will the
Court scrutinize them? If the Court intends to apply a relaxed,
"rational basis" standard, then the requirement of findings seems a
mere formality. Although it uses the language of deference, 52 the
Lopez Court hardly appears to be deferring to Congress. In fact, the
Court's tone trumpets the importance of its role as the ultimate
arbiter of legislative authority,53 cautioning that Congress has
properly been relegated to a "framework of legal uncertainty" about
the scope of its powers "ever since this Court determined that it was
the judiciary's duty 'to say what the law is'. ' - Morrison's message is
even more strident, resonating with the Court's perception that
careful judicial scrutiny of the findings is critical, because those
findings demonstrate that "the concern that we expressed in Lopez
that Congress might use the Commerce Clause to completely
obliterate the Constitution's distinction between national and local
authority seems well founded."'55
Ultimately, however, findings do not solve the much deeper
question of the substantive reach of the Commerce Clause.16  If
151. While United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613-17 (2000), does rot answer
these questions, its refusal to honor the extensive congressional findings in support of the
Violence Against Women Act strongly suggests that the standards the Court sets for
Congress are far more than trivial.
152. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 ("Since [the New Deal], the Court has...
undertaken to decide whether a rational basis existed for concluding that a regulated
activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce.").
153. Cf. Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,536 (1997):
When the Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the province
of the Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law is .... When
the political branches... act against the background of a judicial interpretation
of the Constitution already issued, it must be understood that.., the Court will
treat its precedents with the respect due them under settled principles.., and
contrary expectations must be disappointed.
154. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803)).
155. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615. Justice Souter accuses the majority of discarding the
rational basis scrutiny promised by Lopez in favor of a "new criterion of review." Id. at
637 (Souter, J., dissenting).
156. Nor is the deeper question addressed by the suggestion that Lopez merely
mandates the inclusion of a jurisdictional element in federal criminal or regulatory
enactments. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62. A jurisdictional element requiring, for
[Vol. 28:1
NOSTALGIC FEDERALISM
Lopez's purpose is to confine Congress' power in a way that respects
the idea that not all powers be delegated to the national
government," then the Court's strategy must be to give a concrete
and limited meaning to "interstate" and to "commerce." '158 But this is
where the Court's intentions become most puzzling.
The logic of the Lopez decision, with its emphasis, first, on the
notion that the constitutional structure of delegated powers
necessarily presumes that some subjects are not delegated5. and,
second, on the states' primacy in fields such as education and family
law,,' suggests a major retrenchment. But, at the same time, the
Lopez majority claims to preserve its more modem precedents
concerning the Commerce Clause's reach."' These reassurances,
however, seem a futile attempt to have it both ways. After all, if
Wickard's logic"' were applied consistently to the Gun-Free School
Zones statute, Lopez would have reached the opposite result."6
Still, the Lopez decision offers little more by way of explanation
than the assertion that regulated activities must "substantially affect"
(and not merely "affect") interstate commerce."6 The result in Lopez
example, that the gun was shipped in interstate commerce would not appear to obviate the
Court's skepticism about a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce due to the
weapon's subsequent possession in a school zone.
157. See ic., at 553,566-67.
158. These concepts provided the Court fertile ground for drawing rigid formal
distinctions during the approximately fifty years from the late nineteenth century until
1937, in an effort to curtail congressional authority under the Commerce Clause, and were
ultimately rejected in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), in favor of
a more empirical approach.
159. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557,566,567.
160. See id. at 564.
161. See id. at 559-61 (emphasizing that prior cases involved activities that
"substantially affected" interstate commerce and distinguishing Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942)).
162. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125 ("[E]ven if [an] activity be local and though it may
not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it
exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective of
whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as 'direct' or
'indirect'.").
163. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), for reassuring
references and Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559, seems equally disingenuous.
164. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559. The Court, while acknowledging that the precedents are
less than univocal, derives its newfound standard for scattered comments in, for example,
Jones & Laughlin Steel 301 U.S. at 37 ("a close and substantial relation to interstate
commerce"), Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125 ("a substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce"), and Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 n.27 (1968) ("a substantial relation
to commerce").
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tells us only that, when an activity is itself not commercial (here, the
possession of a gun), 65 and when the specific regulated incident has
only an attenuated connection to any interstate commercial activity,'6
and when the focus of congressional concern (here, the safety of
school zones) lies outside the commercial sphere," then the
Commerce Clause does not authorize federal regulation.
Morrison carries the Court's analysis at least one step further.
Despite the voluminous congressional findings documenting the
substantial economic effects of violence against women, the Court
rejects Congress' "method of reasoning," on the ground that a mere
causal connection between aggregated non-economic activity and
economic outcomes does not constitute a "substantial effect" on
commerce.'6 Here, as in Lopez itself, the only ground for this
principle is the fear that, otherwise, Congress could "completely
obliterate the Constitution's distinction between national and local
authority.' ' 69  The result, despite the Court's continued refusal to
acknowledge that it is overruling Wickardy" is to greatly reinforce the
constitutional significance of the murky distinction between economic
and non-economic activity.
Still, the Court declines to announce "a categorical rule against
aggregating the effects of... noneconomic activity," retaining for
itself the ongoing responsibility for deciding "the limitation of
165. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-561 (explaining that the Court's prior cases all
involved "economic activity" whereas the Gun Free School Zone Act "by its terms has
nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise"). Cf. Reno v. Condon,
528 U.S. 141 (2000) (upholding the Driver Privacy Protection Act's restriction on state
sales of drivers license information because it concerns the sale or release of marketable
information into the interstate stream of commerce ).
166. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (noting that the challenged provision "is a criminal
statute that by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic
enterprise, however broadly one defines those terms."). The Court underscores the point
by going on to note the absence of any express jurisdictional element. See id. at 561-62.
Justice Breyer attempts to make the case that schools bear the requisite connection to
commerce. Id. at 615, (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer's focus on schools rather
than on guns is perplexing, both because guns are more obviously objects that move in
commerce than educational ephemera and because schooling, far more than guns, smacks
of traditional state responsibilities.
167. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565-66 (arguing that impacts on schools do not constitute
requisite connections to commerce).
168. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-13.
169. Id. at 615. Cf. Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 859 (2000) (adopting narrow
statutory construction in order not "to make virtually every arson in the country a federal
offense").
170. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-11.
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congressional authority."'' The remaining unanswered question is
what the Court will say in future cases that reflect some, but not all, of
Lopez's and Morrison's disconnections from the regulation of
interstate commerce. If the regulated activity is itself commercial, or
if a jurisdictional element requires a close nexus to interstate activity,
or if Congress' regulatory concern is primarily economic, will that
suffice to sustain a federal enactment?"n Or must a statute differ from
the Gun-Free School Zone Act and VAWA in all of these respects to
meet the Court's substantial effects test?
For example, what will the Court say about the array of statutes,
including Title VII,'1 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,'74
and the Americans with Disabilities Act,' 5  which prohibit
discrimination in the workplace? These statutes surely bear a closer
connection to commerce, since they deal with the employment
relationship. 76 But they often apply in contexts where any connection
to interstate economic activity depends on the sorts of cumulative and
indirect effects which the Lopez and Morrison Court declined to
countenance. Furthermore, the focus of these statutes is not on the
commercial dimensions of the employment relationship, but rather on
its social and attitudinal dimensions. If the Court's goal is to confine
federal power to the bounds of its delegated authority over
commerce, then, as in Hammer v. Dagenhart,'T  it might well conclude
171. Id. at 616 ("Under our written Constitution,... the limitation of congressional
authority is not solely a matter of legislative grace.").
172. Cf. Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. at 857 (2000) (narrowly construing the arson
provision of Organized Crime Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), excluding application to
owner occupied residences, lest "hardly a building in the land... fall outside the federal
statute's domain"). Of similar import is Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers, 121 S. Ct. 675 (2001) (refusing to defer to the
administrative interpretation of 33 C.F.R. § 328(a)(3)(1999), applying the "Migratory Bird
Rule," 51 Fed. Reg. 412117 (1986) to an abandoned sand and gravel pit, in order to avoid
constitutional questions about Congress' Commerce Clause authority to enact certain
provisions of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 404(a)).
173. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (Supp. 111996).
174. See 29 U.S.C. § 261 et seq. Note that while Kimel only restricts the enforceability
of the ADEA against the states, and while it declines to revisit the Court's prior
determination that the ADEA was a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause power, 528
U.S. at 76, its broad language suggests wider doubts about the propriety of congressional
action in this area. See id. at 83-92.
175. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. IV 1998).
176. Nor are anti-discrimination laws limited to the paid labor market. See, e.g., Title
II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act of 1968.
177. 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding that the Child Labor Law, which regulated the
minimum age of workers in certain industries, was not a valid exercise of Congress'
commerce power).
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that these statutes aim to control, not "the means by which commerce
is carried on,"'78 but rather the social problems of racism and other
forms of discrimination.
179
In an earlier era, one might have turned to the Tenth
Amendment as the primary protector against federal incursions into
undelegated regulatory spheres more properly belonging to the
states. But, in this one comer of federalism jurisprudence, Garcia
continues to play a substantial cautionary role."s°  Indeed, as
interpreted in New York and Printz, the Tenth Amendment's mission
is far less ambitious, restricting only the methods by which federal
aims are achieved and not the aims themselves.' Thus, while the
Tenth Amendment might preclude Congress from imposing
enforcement responsibilities on state or local officials in furtherance
of the mandates of VAWA or the ADA, it does not directly question
congressional authority to regulate in these areas. Beyond questions
of utilization of state officers to further federal aims, the Tenth
Amendment appears relegated to its role as the tautologous echo of
Article I's enumeration of federal legislative powers.'
Unlike the Tenth Amendment cases, the sovereign immunity
decisions clearly raise significant issues of how far congressional
authority is constrained. Here, as with Lopez, part of the Court's
message is to clarify Congress' obligation to justify its choices to the
Court. Before the Court will turn to the question of whether
Congress has the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity, it
requires that Congress make its "intention unmistakably clear in the
language of the statute."'
178. Id. at 269.
179. Consider, for example, the proposed Employment Non-Discrimination Act of
1999, S.B. 1276, H.B. 2355 ("ENDA"), whose purpose was to extend several of the
protections of Title VII to employees victimized because of their sexual orientation.
While ENDA's coverage was coterminous with Title VII (employees in industries
affecting commerce), its clear gravamen was to provide a federal remedy against
homophobia in the workplace, thus raising significant Lopez problems, and suggesting
that ENDA might better be rested on Fourteenth Amendment grounds. That path,
however, runs afoul of the Boerne-based problems discussed at notes 112-125, supra and
text accompanying notes 188-217, infra.
180. Cf. Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formulator the
Future, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1563, 1573 (1994) (characterizing New York as a "surprisingly
strong" departure from Garcia).
181. See supra text accompanying notes 47-59.
182. The latest confirmation of the Tenth Amendment's modest role comes in Reno v.
Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000). For further discussion of that case, see infra text
accompanying notes 307-10.
183. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000) (quoting Dellmuth v.
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But much of the thrust of the recent cases goes far beyond this
clear statement rule. As with the Tenth Amendment cases, the
Court's strategy is to limit the means available to Congress in the
enforcement of accepted federal ends, but, when the gravamen of the
inquiry is the scope of judicial enforcement jurisdiction, the new
limitations can be strikingly more far reaching. In the context of anti-
discrimination statutes, for example, the effect of the sovereign
immunity cases is that, while Congress may retain the authority to
regulate private workplace behavior,'s its authority over state
employees is ephemeral at best." Congress remains free to declare
the rights of state employees to be free of workplace discrimination,
but when those employees look for a way to vindicate their apparent
rights, they find that Congress lacks the power to open the doors to
either federal or state courts for them.'" Of course, as Justice
O'Connor cavalierly reminds us, Kimel "does not signal the end of
the line for employees who find themselves subject to...
discrimination at the hands of their state employers," although the
remedies that remain - enforcement actions by federal regulatory
Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989) (quoting Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
234,242 (1985))).
184. This is particularly plausible if the regulation was enacted under the Commerce
Clause, as elaborated in note 116, supra. Congressional authority to reach private
behavior under Section Five was problematic even before Boerne and Morrison. See
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (discussing various theories of the
constitutionality of statutes prohibiting private conspiracies which interfere with
Fourteenth Amendment rights); Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263
(1993) (holding that the constitutionality of prohibition of private conspiracies to interfere
with civil rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), depends on whether it was enacted under the
Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendment).
185. For purposes of its sovereign immunity analysis, the Court makes clear that
employees of local governments and other political subdivisions of the states are to be
treated like private sector employees, not like state workers. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 756 (1999) ("the principle of sovereign immunity... bars suits against States but not
lesser entities"). By contrast, the Court's prior assault on federal protections of state and
local workers, grounded in the Tenth Amendment, treated state and local workers alike.
See Usery v. Charleston Cty. Sch. Dist., 558 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1977).
186. The Equal Pay Act provides another possible example. Although the Act
survived scrutiny in the Usery era, see idL at 1171 (holding that Congress' power to enforce
the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment is not "circumscribed" by the
Tenth Amendment), its applicability to state employers has again been brought into
question in the wake of Kimel. Compare Hundertmark v. State of Florida Dep't of
Transportation, 205 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding the Equal Pay Act was a valid
exercise of Congressional authority under the Fourteenth Amendment, making Eleventh
Amendment immunity unavailable as a defense) with Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399,
402 n.2 (7th Cir. 2000) (expressing doubts about the viability of an Equal Pay Act claim
against a state after Kimel).
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agencies and the vagaries of state law - are likely to provide little
solace to most victims.187
The changes wrought in both the Commerce Clause and the
sovereign immunity doctrines have one clear corollary: to place at
center stage the scope of congressional authority under Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment. By a process of doctrinal elimination,
Section Five seems to have become the residual source for
congressional authority to address vital national concerns which are
not primarily economic, and the primary path by which Congress can
supercede the states' sovereign immunity. Yet, it is here that the
Court's new direction is perhaps least clear.
Boerne tells us little more than that Congress can only act
remedially, to cure violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's
substantive first section. This, in itself, is neither new nor shocking.
After all, as early as 1883, the Court held in the Civil Rights Cases
that congressional legislative power was circumscribed by the reach of
Section One, so that Congress could not reach private discriminatory
behavior under Section Five.'s Boerne alone may add little new,
since the Court perceived RFRA as a "direct response" contradicting
its own most recent delineation of the existence and logic of First
Amendment rights."8
On that view, Boerne merely clarifies and reinforces the Court's
insistence that Congress must build upon the meaning of Section One
consistently with the Court's interpretations. If Congress can connect
its regulatory solution to a Section One concern that is not judicially
foreclosed, and can document that connection with suitable findings,
then this reading suggests judicial deference. For example, the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), " ' which
regulates state programs to educate disabled students, could be
justified as one programmatic approach to the rights of the disabled, a
187. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91. The availability of prospective injunctive relief, under Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (holding that Eleventh Amendment immunity does not
affect injunctive suits brought against a state's officers), likewise will typically offer little
meaningful help. For further discussion of Ex Parte Young, see infra text accompanying
notes 243-246.
188. 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). And of course, Morrison breathes new life into this
constraint.
189. See Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997) ("Congress enacted RFRA in
direct response to the Court's decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of
Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).").
190. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487.
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group whose claims have been recognized under Section One."'
But this analysis leaves two open questions. First, to what level
of scrutiny must a group be entitled" (or does a right invoke)"
before Congress can regulate on its behalf? More specifically, can
Congress only provide "remedial" protections for groups (or rights)
that the Court has held entitled to something more than minimal
rational basis scrutiny? If that is correct, can Congress act only on
behalf of groups whose claims are strictly scrutinized? All that
Boerne tells us is that Congress can neither change the level of
scrutiny on its own, nor act where the Court has expressly found no
constitutional violation. And all that the Court's prior Section Five
holdings tell us is that Congress can act in matters affecting race or
fundamental rights."94
Kimel v. Florida purports to answer some of these questions,
191. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). We
return shortly to the complexities surrounding Cleburne's recognition of such claims. See
infra text accompanying notes 195-197.
192. For example, the level of scrutiny for gender claims is by no means clear or
uniform. At the end of the spectrum closest to the rational basis test are cases like Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76, (1971) (characterizing issue as "whether a difference in the sex of
competing applicants [bears] a rational relationship to a state objective"). At the other
extreme, closest to race, is United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (holding that
defenders of gender-based classifications must demonstrate "an exceedingly persuasive
justification"). Squarely in the middle is Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding
that gender classifications must "serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to the achievement of these objectives"). In Kimel the Court appears
to adopt the Virginia formulation.
193. For example, could Congress codify Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), under its
Section Five power? Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), appears to
overrule Roe, albeit sub silentio, not only by eliminating the trimester framework but by
lowering the standard of proof from "important state interest," Roe, 410 U.S. at 154, to
"undue burden," Casey, 505 U.S. at 886, and by reallocating the burden of meeting this
standard from the government to the woman. Could Congress now turn the clock back to
Roe's formulation and how would the Court go about answering that question? Are
reproductive rights as fundamental as the voting rights in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
651 (1966)? Moreover, even though Roe did not depend on a gender analysis, Justice
O'Connor has recognized that women's "ability to terminate their pregnancies [are]
characteristics unique to the class of women." Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,
506 U.S. 263, 350 (1993). Would Justice O'Connor, the author of Kimel, then consider a
Roe statute a gender classification? Justice Ginsburg has long been an advocate of this
approach. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in
Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985).
194. Holding in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 126, 128-130 (1970), that Congress
had no authority to lower the voting age in state elections, Justice Black agreed that
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 651 (1966), should be limited to race discrimination, else
congressional power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause would "blot out all state
power, leaving the 50 states as little more than impotent figureheads."
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holding that Congress, under Section Five, may not statutorily expand
the minimal protections the Constitution affords to victims of age
discrimination.95 Since the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA") prohibited more behavior than Section One condoned, it
was the type of incongruent and out of proportion overreaching that
Boerne forbade. Justice O'Connor's careful contrast of classifications
which trigger a more heightened scrutiny implies significantly greater
legislative latitude to act on behalf of race or gender.9 In the case of
the IDEA, the question is complicated further by the obscurity of the
Court's identification, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
of disability's precise place on the scrutiny spectrum.'9,
The second question involves the nexus between the legislative
"remedy" and the Section One "substance". In Katzenbach v.
Morgan, Congress had restricted the use of English literacy tests for
195. See, generally, Kimel, 528 U.S. 62. The cases about age discrimination, Vance v.
Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979) (foreign service officers) and Massachusetts Bd. Of Retirement
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (police) had applied the rational basis test. In EEOC v
Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983), the Court upheld Congressional power under the
Commerce Clause to extend the ADEA to state and local governments. Kimel echoes
Chief Justice Burger's dissent that the extension not only violated the Tenth Amendment
but that Congress lacked the authority to enact similar legislation under Section Five,
since the Court had never held that Section One prohibited age discrimination. "Congress
may act only where a violation lurks." kd at 260.
196. See Kimel, 528 U.S. 87-88. Ironically, this formulation reverses the commonly
understood meaning of the distinction between strict and minimal scrutiny. "Strict
scrutiny" is usually fatal to legislative experiments because few, if any, statutes pass the
strict scrutiny test. On the other hand, rational basis review connotes extreme deference
to the legislature; under this approach most statutes readily survive.
197. In Cleburne, the majority denied suspect or quasi-suspect classification status to
the mentally retarded, although Justice Marshall, concurring in part and dissenting in part
suggested that despite this denial, the Court had, in fact, heightened the scrutiny. 473 U.S.
at 440, 458. Despite the majority's use of the words "rationally related," kla at 446,
Professor Tribe describes the majority's level of scrutiny as "intermediate." TRIBE, supra
note 34, at 1612.
Indeed, in Cleburne, the Court specifically suggested that one of the reasons it was
not elevating the scrutiny of disability-based distinctions was its belief that legislatures
need flexibility and "freedom from judicial oversight in shaping and limiting their remedial
efforts," and that legislators were better able to resolve problems faced by indihiduals with
disabilities than the judiciary. 473 U.S. at 443-45. Congress subsequently responded to
disability discrimination by enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A.
sections 12111 et seq., in part under its Section 5 authority. This Term, the Court has
agreed to decide whether, under its Kimel analysis, Congress exceeded its authority
passing the ADA, an argument that rests ironically on the theory that, since the Court
failed to heighten the scrutiny for disability discrimination, Congress could not create new
rights for the disabled. See University of Ala. Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, cert. granted in
part, 529 U.S. 1065 (2000). The notion that Congress cannot enact prophylactic legislation
around rights that are subject to rational basis review is one of the major issues presented
in Garrett.
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voter qualification in state elections, even though the Constitution
reserves to the states the authority to set voter qualifications and the
Court had previously upheld the constitutionality of literacy tests.1 9
Despite the absence of congressional findings,"9 the Katzenbach
Court reasoned that Congress could have deemed increased Hispanic
voter participation an appropriate remedy for potential racial
discrimination in the provision of municipal services.' The nexus
between literacy tests and race discrimination in municipal services,
however presumed and/or attenuated, sufficed to authorize Congress
to act.
In Boerne, by contrast, the Court found that RFRA,
notwithstanding the legislative record documenting state and localimpingements on free exercise of religion, lacked the appropriate
remedial connection to First Amendment violations, primarily
because the Court discredited the legislative justification."' The
Court looked to the "congruence" and "proportionality"'  between
RFRA's prohibitions and the pattern of problems in the legislative
record and concluded that Congress must have been pursuing, not its
proper remedial role, but an exercise in independent interpretation of
the Constitution.
What lessons do these cases impart when we turn, for example,
198. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
199. The lack of findings was especially troubling to Justice Harlan, who was unwilling
to defer to Congress' judgments about the extent of its authority, particularly on a barren
legislative record. Id at 659-67 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
200. See id. at 641. There are two theories in Katzenbach: one addressing the
federalism issue and the other the separation of powers problem. The latter, which
suggests that Congress could reasonably conclude that English literacy tests violated the
Equal Protection Clause, is perhaps more far-reaching because of the Court's prior
caselaw upholding literacy tests in Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd Of Elections, 360
U.S. 45 (1959). Justice Brennan's reasoning, known as the "ratchet theory," limited
Congressional power to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment substantively to those
instances where Congress was expanding and not contracting Constitutional rights: "We
emphasize that Congress' power under §5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce the
guarantees of the Amendment; §5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute
these guarantees." Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 651, n.10. But the ratchet theory does not
satisfactorily explain why Congress has interpretive authority at all, let alone, in one
direction. See William Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal
Protection, 27 STAN. L. REv. 603 (1975). Nor does it address the reality that expanding
the rights of "A" may well constrict the rights of "B." For example, whose rights are
expanded and whose deleted by a fetal rights law? By anti-bussing legislation? By
affirmative action? Moreover, Kimel appears to overrule the ratchet theory, at least with
respect to non-suspect classes.
201. See Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,532 (1997).
202. Itt at 533.
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to VAWA? Assuming a Section One concern for gender equality,
how specific a nexus must there be between that concern and the
specific protections provided by VAWA? Must there have been a
determination that gender-motivated violence poses a sufficiently
serious threat to gender equality to satisfy the Court's congruence
and proportionality standard? If so, who must make that
determination?' Must Congress have made express findings to that
effect? Or must the courts have previously recognized a
constitutional right to freedom from gender-motivated violence? Or
can the Court draw reasonable inferences based on the legislative
record and common knowledge? And finally, does nexus require that
one or more of these institutions also find that the federal remedy
addresses a problem that the states had failed to redress?'
Somewhat surprisingly, Morrison fails to provide direct answers
to most of these questions. Although Rehnquist's opinion references
Boerne's insistence on congruence and proportionality, it is strangely
silent about how and why the voluminous findings made in
connection with VAWA succeed or fail to comply with that mandate.
Even more enigmatic is the Court's failure to apply (or even discuss)
Kimel's promised deference to gender classifications in the case of a
statute directed at gender-motivated violence. Instead, Morrison
(re)treads a far more ancient doctrinal path, holding that Congress
lacks authority to enact the challenged portion of VAWA because it
is directed not at states but at private actors.'5 Reaching one hundred
and twenty years into its past, the Court revives the rule of the Civil
Rights Cases that limits to state actors suits brought under Section
One and legislation passed under Section Five.' As Justice Breyer
cogently notes in dissent, the majority ignores the fact that the
gravamen of VAWA was to remedy the behavior of those states
which had failed to meet their Section One obligations, a fact that was
203. Unlike Lopez's relatively deferential approach to findings, Boerne specifically
suggests that, even when Congress provides appropriate findings, the Court will not be
particularly deferential in assessing them. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). See also Kimel. 528 U.S. at
89 (observing that congressional findings fell "well short of the mark."). Does this reflect
a different standard for Article One and Section Five contexts?
204. Chief Justice Rehnquist had earlier warned that VAWA would clutter up the
federal courts with domestic relations disputes, arguing that federal judicial resources
should be "reserved for issues where important national issues predominate." William H.
Rehnquist, Chief Justices's 1991 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciay, THE THIRD
BRANCH, Jan. 1992, at 1-3.




fully documented not only by Congress, but also by the states.'
Boerne, since it concerned a statute which applied particularly to
states and their political subdivisions, did not have occasion to
address Section Five's authorization of congressional enactments that
apply not only to governmental actors but to private entities as well,
but Morrison appears to have foreclosed that option.' Even in
advance of Morrison, Boerne's insistence on an almost mirror image
conformity between Section One and Section Five surely laid the
groundwork for a subsequent attack on a range of federal statutes
which regulate private behavior.10 Indeed, Boerne's discussion of the
legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, which emphasized
Congress' rejection of a broader precursor,2 11 provides a stronger
foundation for restricting Section Five's reach to public entities than
for the substance/remedy distinction on which the Court focused. In
the Court's retelling, the central objections to the prior draft were
that it would have allowed Congress to legislate generally on "all
subjects affecting life, liberty, and property,, 212 thereby displacing
core state responsibilities. While construing the ensuing draft to
restrict congressional authority to remedial concerns may offer some
answer to these concerns, construing it to limit Congress to regulation
of the states, and not of private actors, would seem a more convincing
reading of the history, as well as one that finds greater support in the
textual differences between the two versions.2
Morrison's invocation of the Civil Rights Cases in this context is
207. See id. at 664 (Breyer, J., dissenting). As Justice Breyer also points out, this was
not the kind of claim before the Court in the Civil Rights Cases. Id at 664-65.
208. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
209. Thus, the question remains whether RFRA is still in play as a restriction on
private behavior. The theoretical basis for congressional authority to reach private
behavior under Section Five is eloquently spelled out in Archibald Cox, Forward.-
Constitutional Adjudication and Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARv. L. REv. 91, 116-
21 (1966). Professor Tribe has suggested that this issue was "at least partly academic"
because of the scope of congressional power under the Commerce Clause and the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. TRIBE, supra note 34, at 964. Obviously, the
cases that have impelled the writing of this article have moved that issue back to center
stage.
210. See, e.g., supra statutes cited in notes 173-176.
211. 521 U.S. at 520-21 (discussing defeat of Bingham draft).
212. L at 521 (quoting Sen. Stewart).
213. Indeed, there has been a lively scholarly debate over whether the 39th Congress
intended to limit Section One to state action at all. See, e.g., JACOBUS TENBROEK,
EQUAL UNDER LAW (1965). Cf Kimel, 528 U.S. at 90 (doubting whether congressional
findings "with respect to the private sector could be extrapolated to support a finding of
unconstitutional age discrimination in the public sector").
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very much of a piece with the Court's solicitude for state sovereignty.
One of the earliest theoretical justifications for the state action
doctrine was predicated on federalism concerns, finding congressional
regulation of private conduct impermissible because it "steps into the
domain of local jurisprudence., 214  Yet, Morrison's Section Five
analysis is more nostalgic than rigorous. 5
Section Five remains a puzzle. While Boerne does more to
raise than to answer these questions, it, like Lopez, clearly assigns a
new importance to congressional findings and signals a heightened
sensitivity to separation of powers concerns. 17 The Court could
reduce Boerne to little more than a series of technical hurdles readily
overcome by careful findings and skillful drafting, except in the rare
case where Congress seeks directly to reverse a Supreme Court
constitutional precedent. At the other extreme, it could develop
Boerne into a radical restriction on congressional power to determine
its own agenda in matters pertaining to individual rights, leaving it
only with the instrumentalist authority to specify remedies for
judicially identified problems. Kimel adopts the latter approach, at
least for rational basis classifications, and Morrison appears to follow
a similar path, at least for legislation directed at private behavior. A
third, albeit increasingly less likely, possibility is that the Court will
grope toward some middle ground that leaves Congress (and the rest
of us) perplexed and invites an expanding cottage industry of lower
court litigation.
So, where does the federalism balance rest today? If the Court
neither expands nor delimits its recent decisions, to what extent has
214. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 14. In other words, limiting rights guaranteed by
the Constitution and enforced by federal courts leaves a large area of activity for state
regulation.
215. For example, the Court treats the ancient cases as particularly worthy because of
their great age and because of their authors' contemporaneous familiarity with the
Fourteenth Amendment. By contrast, the Court rather summarily dismisses the more
modem cases (including those which cast significant doubt on the cases from the
reconstruction period) because the failure of some of their authors to spell out their
reasoning in great detail "is simply not the way that reasoned constitutional adjudication
proceeds." Morrison, 529 U.S. at 622-24. The Court's approach in Morrison ultimately
creates more problems than it solves. See infra text accompanying notes 323-327.
216. The puzzle is further complicated by the problems (or opportunities) presented by
the Court's recent resuscitation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and
Immunities Clause in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). The newly recognized citizenship
rights of Saenz appear to expand the definition of the privileges of federal citizenship to
include the right of interstate travel. Can Congress, therefore, now enact legislation under
Section Five remedying violations of that right?
217. See, e.g., Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532, 535-36.
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the scope of congressional authority shrunk from the longstanding
New Deal consensus?
The Court's Tenth Amendment and sovereign immunity
decisions, while they have not affected the scope of concerns that
Congress can address, have introduced significant new limits on the
tools that it can deploy to address those concerns."' The Tenth
Amendment restrictions, which preclude Congress from requiring
state and local executive and legislative officers to serve as agents of a
federal program, may complicate the means for furthering federal
policies. But, so long as Congress can employ its own agents and
establish its own mandates, and particularly so long as Congress can
exercise its spending power to condition financial assistance on state
cooperation with federal programs,' 9 these complications seem little
more than an inconvenience. By contrast, the sovereign immunity
limits by foreclosing both state and federal judicial relief for state
violations of many federal requirements, eviscerate a core component
of legislative power.' This foreclosure leaves the very real threat
that federally defined rights against states will often go without
meaningful remedies, although only the states themselves (and not
other categories of state actors) benefit from this immunity, and even
the states remain subject to prospective remedies and to federal
administrative actions.
The Court's revanchist reading of the Commerce Clause cuts
deeper still, introducing new, if still murky, limits on the range of
substantive concerns Congress can address. ' At the least, these new
restraints, by requiring a "substantial effect" on commerce,' and by
carefully reviewing congressional satisfaction of that requirement,'
undermine Congress' presumed authority to pronounce federal policy
on any matter of national concern that touches, however tangentially,
on commercial activity. Even in cases where the connection to
commerce is less attenuated, the post-Lopez, post-Morrison Congress
will be well advised to lay a thorough evidentiary foundation
dovetailing its concerns to the functioning of the national economy, in
anticipation of judicial scrutiny of its findings. Further, if the Court is
serious in its insistence that an "enumeration presumes something
218. See supra text accompanying notes 48-59, 91-110.
219. See infra text accompanying notes 229-236.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 91-110.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 59-70,138-179.
222. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
223. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614-15.
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that is not enumerated," 4 there remain doubts about whether even a
documented and palpable connection to commerce will suffice to
sustain enactments whose primary concerns are non-economic.m
Both the narrowing of Congress' Commerce Clause power and
the unavailability of judicial remedies for state violations of Article I
based enactments inevitably invite increased reliance on Congress'
Fourteenth Amendment powers. But here, too, the scope of
congressional authority has been sharply constrained. 6 The Court's
insistence that Congress rest its enactments on well recognized
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive protections
may leave little latitude for measures addressing concerns other than
race, gender, or fundamental rights. As with the Commerce Clause,
the Court has placed a new emphasis on the need for, and the
substance of, congressional findings.'m At least with respect to state
violations, the Court appears to be obviating any distinctions between
the Commerce Clause and Section Five. Morrison's curtailment of
Section Five's application to private behavior places new pressures on
the Commerce Clause.
B. How Much Further May We Go?
The federalism landscape has changed dramatically. Still, if
Congress steps carefully around and over the obstacles that the
Court's recent decisions have placed in its path, it appears to retain
much of its broad subject-matter authority, and even much of its
ability to regulate and guide the behavior of states and their
subdivisions. But the story is far from over, and, if the Court's
majority continues to pursue the nostalgic vision that has brought it to
224. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553.
225. The literature about the difficulty in establishing improper motive as a basis for
invalidating legislation is extensive. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and
Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36 (1977); Ely,
Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205
(1970), and Symposium, Legislative Motivation, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 925 (1978).
226. See supra text accompanying notes 110-121,187-202.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 203-207.
228. The courts continue to consider a blizzard of cases testing the limits of the new
federalism. See, e.g., supra notes 5-8, 114, 186. A growing body of scholarly wNTiting also
encourages the continued evolution of the Court's federalism agenda. See, e.g., Bradford
R. Clark, Translating Federalism: A Structural Approach, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1161
(1998); Raoul Berger, Judicial Manipulation of the Commerce Clause, 74 TEX. L. REV. 695
(1996); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle,
111 HARV. L. REV. 2181 (1998); Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional
Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REV. 795 (1996).
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this point, the remaining doctrinal foundations for broad
congressional authority may prove no more impregnable than those
which recent case law has already swept away.
Consider first the Spending Clause, 9 the most significant source
of congressional authority to avoid judicial retrenchment so far.' As
the Court itself has acknowledged, as recently as New York,"
Congress' freedom to condition federal financial assistance on state
conformity with federal requirements empowers Congress to sidestep
many of the Commerce Clause limits the Court has placed on it. Yet,
at bottom, this empowerment relies on a permissive reading of the
Spending Clause power, which, like the pre-Lopez permissive
understanding of the Commerce Clause, grants broad discretion to
Congress to determine what federal requirements are appropriately
germane to a federal spending program.'
It would take but a small step for the Court, following the model
of Lopez, to find new teeth in its existing requirements that the
conditions be sufficiently related to the purposes and interests behind
the federal program73 or that the financial inducement not be "so
coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns into
compulsion."' - Indeed, if the Court found it necessary to build some
limitations into the scope of commerce, in order to avoid conceding
plenary power to the federal government, we perhaps should wonder
whether the Court won't also find it necessary to revisit its long-
229. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power to ... pay the Debts
and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.").
230. Despite some earlier intimations to the contrary, challenges to federal spending
on state autonomy grounds have met with little success. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483
U.S. 203 (1987). Cf. Pennhurst State Sch. Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)
(noting existence of limits on spending power, which "issue, however, is not now before
us"). Alexander v. Sandoval, recently argued before the Court, may well provide an
opportunity to revisit these Spending Clause issues. See 2001 U.S. Trans-Lexis 10 (Jan. 16,
2001).
231. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
232. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,207-08 (1987).
233. See id. at 207.
234. 1& at 211. Cf. iL at 218 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that these
requirements were violated by the provision reviewed in Dole itself). See also Bradley v.
Arkansas Dept. of Educ., 189 F.3d 745,757 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding the Rehabilitation Act
excessively coercive to pass muster under the Spending Clause); Litman v. George Mason
Univ., 186 F.3d 544, 556-57 (4th Cir. 1999) (inviting Supreme Court to revisit and narrow
its interpretation of the Spending Clause); Virginia Dept. of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559,
569-70 (4th Cir. 1997) (questioning whether threat to withhold all federal funding for
special education for state's failure to provide services to a narrow class constitutes
impermissible coercion).
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standing view that the power to spend for "the general Welfare of the
United States" extends beyond Article One's substantive grants of
congressional authority. 5  Without such a delimitation of the
Spending Clause, the specter of limitless federal legislative power, the
primary target of Lopez, seems alive and well. So, perhaps, as some
of the Justices hinted in Alden, this remaining central premise of the
New Deal consensus is also ripe for revision. 6
Similar retrenchment could easily diminish the scope of
congressional power to preempt state regulation. Indeed, an unlikely
coalition of justices, dissenting in a recent preemption case, 7 chose to
emphasize the federalism consequences of the Supremacy Clause and
to suggest the need for a clear-statement requirement, reminiscent of
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Gregory v. Ashcroft," as a
235. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936):
While... the power to tax is not unlimited, its confines are set in the clause
which confers it, and not in those of Section Eight which bestow and define the
legislative powers of Congress. It results that the power of Congress to authorize
expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct
grants of legislative power found in the Constitution.
236. 527 U.S. at 755. Consider too Justice Kennedy's dissent in Davis v. Board of
Education, 526 U.S. 629 (1999), a case which appeared to involve only an exercise in the
rules of statutory construction. One year earlier, Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist.,
524 U.S. 274, 289 (1998), had held that a school district was not liable in damages under
Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. section 1681 (a) (1999), for a
teacher's sexual harassment of a student unless the school had actual knowledge of the
misconduct and responded with deliberate indifference. Davis involved student to student
harassment under the same statute and Justice O'Connor applied the same test.
Dissenting, Justice Kennedy characterized the issue not as one of "routine statutory
construction," but as a threat to state sovereignty. Davis, 526 U.S. at 657. "The Nation's
schoolchildren will learn their first lessons about federalism in classrooms where the
federal government is the ever-present regulator." Id at 658. Kennedy castigates the
majority's "watered-down version" of the Spending Clause clear statement rule. which he
labels a poor substitute for the real protections of state and local autonomy that our
constitutional system requires.
237. See Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 887 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting, joined by Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, J.J.) (quoting Alden's demand that
"the constitutional role of the States as sovereign entities" be respected). Of course, the
dissenters could easily have relied instead on the ample complexities of existing
preemption law. Cf. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (similar), Silkwood
v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984) (discussing and deploying standard preemption
analysis).
238. 501 U.S. 452. Query also whether Lopez also implicates the Dormant Commerce
Clause, which prohibits States from regulating in areas of commerce which are properly
regulated by Congress even when Congress has not yet acted. May states now be allowed
to regulate more broadly as Congress can regulate less? Will restrictions imposed by the
dormant Commerce Clause be narrowed concomitantly with Congress' Commerce Clause
authority? See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978) ("In the
absence of federal legislation, these subjects are open to control by the States so long as
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precondition for a finding of preemption.
The Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence is another area
that seems ripe for further evolution. We have noted four significant
limitations on the scope of the Court's recent rulings: their
inapplicability to congressional enactments under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the continuing availability of suits against state officers
under Ex parte Young, the inapplicability of sovereign immunity to
suits against political subdivisions of the states, and the unchallenged
legitimacy of the enforcement powers of federal agencies." But, each
of these limitations rests on foundations no more secure than those
which the Court has eroded with impunity in its recent cases, and the
nostalgic revisionism of the Court's contemporary federalism could
easily be deployed to demolish them as well.
Consider first the distinctive treatment of congressional action
under the Fourteenth Amendment. If the Court's sovereign
immunity theories rested primarily on the Eleventh Amendment,
then the argument that subsequent amendments escape its
restrictions would make obvious sense. But, once the Court has made
clear, as it does in Alden, that the Eleventh Amendment is no more
than a textual harbor for a fundamental feature of the constitutional
structure,'f then singling out the Fourteenth Amendment for special
treatment requires substantial further justification. Perhaps that
justification can be found in arguments about the way in which the
Reconstruction Amendments alter the fundamental constitutional
design.24' However, on a slightly narrower view, these amendments
can be characterized simply as federalizing certain rights.4 2 Such a
view leaves open the question of their impact on state sovereign
immunity.
Similar concerns face the availability of actions directed, not
against the state itself, but against its officers. It is no novelty to
they act within the restraints imposed by the Commerce Clause itself."). In other words,
does doctrinal consistency demand that, as the Commerce Clause power recedes, the
"restraints imposed by the Commerce Clause" on states recede.
239. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 116,187.
240. 527 U.S. at 727.
241. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59; Alden, 527 U.S. at 756; Kimel, 528 U.S. at
80-81; TRIBE, supra note 34, at 1302.
242. See, e.g., The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1873) (holding that
the purpose of amendments 13-15 was to guarantee federal protection to rights of newly
emancipated slaves). For analysis of how the turn of the century Court reconciled federal
protection of civil rights with autonomous state spheres, see TRIBE, supra note 34, at 1311-
12.
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observe that Ex parte Young depends at its core on a fiction,24 3 the
pretense that a judicial order directing an officer of the state to take
some action in her official capacity is not an order directed against the
state itself.2' And there is little more substance to the suggestion that
such prospective orders have a less immediate or significant impact
on a state's resources than would a direct imposition of monetary
damages.245 So, if the Court is truly concerned with protecting its
vision of state sovereignty, and if it justifies its mission as the
vindication of principles of sovereign immunity implicit in the
constitutional design (and if it continues to feel unconstrained by its
own precedents), there is little in the reasoning underlying Ex parte
Young to save it from repudiation. 6
The distinction between the states and their political subdivisions
rests on similarly tenuous ground. As the Court has long recognized,
cities, counties, school districts, and other political subdivisions exist
only as creatures of the states, possessing only those powers delegated
to them by the state, and serving only as instrumentalities of the
state.247 While this subsidiary status can support the conclusion that
such subdivisions are not themselves sovereigns, and hence are less
deserving of special protections or deference than the states
themselves, it can equally lead to the opposite result. If the
delegation of a certain state responsibility (such as education or
public health) to a political subdivision is the state's chosen way of
addressing that responsibility, then the actions of the subdivisions are
in furtherance of the state's ends, and interference with those actions
243. See, e.g., Coeur d' Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 269,272,280-81 (referring to Ex Parte
Young as resting on a fiction); Halderman, 465 U.S. at 114 n.25 (1984) (same).
244. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123,159-60 (1908).
245. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,667-68 (1974).
246. Indeed, the Court may already have planted the seeds for such an assault in its
1997 decision in Coeur d'Alene Tribe. There, the Court found Ex parte Young
inapplicable to a suit against state officials to clarify tribal and state rights to certain land,
because a holding against the state officials would implicate "special sovereignty interests"
of the state. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 281. But, in fact, only a difference of degree
separates the "sovereignty interests" implicit in state officials' actions regarding titles to
land from the state interests involved in virtually any action undertaken by virtually any
state officer acting in her official capacity. If the officer's actions are undertaken pursuant
to state law and if they bear some relationship to the expenditure or protection of some
state resource, it would take but a small step for the Court to conclude that the actual
impact of litigation against her fell not on the officer but on the sovereign itself.
247. See, e.g., Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907); Wisconsin Public
Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 607-08 (1991).
248. See, e.g., Community Communications Co., v. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 53 (1982)
("Ours is a 'dual system of government...' which has no place for sovereign cities.").
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disturbs the state's pursuit of its sovereign interests. Longstanding
precedent may support allowing suits against political subdivisions,249
but the Court's recent sovereign immunity cases have not been
particularly constrained by precedent. If the Court's objective is to
respect the states' sovereignty, then a natural step would shelter from
suit those political subdivisions to which a state chose to extend its
sovereign immunity.'
The question of Congress' authority to authorize enforcement
actions against the states when brought by federal agents raises a
similar set of issues. While the Alden Court asserts that a suit brought
on behalf of the federal government "differs in kind from the suit of
an individual,"21 the two differences it notes hardly afford a
compelling warrant for federal authority. For one, the Court asserts
that "the Constitution contemplates suits among the members of the
federal system as an alternative to extralegal measures," 2 but the
Court identifies nothing in the constitutional text that expressly
authorizes, or even explicitly contemplates, suits by the federal
government against the states. Second, the Court notes that "suits
brought by the United States itself require the exercise of political
responsibility for each suit prosecuted against a State," 23 but, as we
have seen from the history of Garcia, the Court's deference to
politically-based protections of state autonomy has been anything but
constant. If these are the only foundations supporting the Court's
continued acceptance of federal enforcement actions, it is not hard to
imagine a future decision concluding that the resulting incursions on
state sovereignty, in the absence of express constitutional warrant,
exceeded congressional authority under the constitutional design.
H1. Some Lessons Not Learned
At present, the ultimate contours of the Court's emerging
federalism jurisprudence remain highly indeterminate. But the vision
that informs its recent decisions certainly threatens to blossom into a
249. See, e.g., Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978);
Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,280-81 (1977).
250. For a good overview of the history, and recent trends, of state grants of immunity
to local political subdivisions, see Ann Judith Gellis, Legislative Reforms of Governmental
Tort Liability: Overreacting to Minimal Evidence, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 375, 378-79, 392-98
(1990).
251. 527 U.S. at 755.
252. Id. at 755-56.
253. Id. at 756.
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full-blown constitutional counter-revolution that returns us to a pre-
New Deal world in which federal legislative authority is narrowly
constrained. Whether, and to what extent, the Court goes down this
path will be a central concern for Court watchers and constitutional
scholars over the next several terms.
In this section, we consider two issues that are likely to be key
determinants of the Court's actual course. First is the question
whether the critical five Justice coalition, which has provided the core
support for the Court's recent federalism decisions, shares a
sufficiently coherent perspective or a sufficiently consistent agenda to
sustain the constitutional transformation that they have begun.
Second is the question whether the quaint "separate spheres"
conception of federal state relations, which lies at the heart of the
Court's emerging jurisprudence, will provide an adequate intellectual
foundation for a constitutional framework that can withstand the
centralizing pressures of contemporary American economic, social
and political reality. While it remains far too early to draw definitive
conclusions, these questions leave us with substantial doubts about
whether the musty acorns that the Court has salvaged from its
nineteenth-century cases will ever grow into the sturdy forest of a
restrictive twenty-first century federalism.
A. Deconstructing the Court's Nostalgic Coalition
The Court's recent federalism decisions have rested on the
narrowest of majorities. With the exception of the six-to-three
decision in Boerne, each of the Court's significant federalism cases
from Lopez to the present has been decided on a five-to-four vote,
and, again with the exception of Boerne, each has relied on the same
five-member bloc, consisting of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and O'Connor.' If the Court is to
entrench and expand its nostalgic federalism, it will almost certainly
254. This stable five-four division is found in Lopez, Seminole Tribe, Printz, Alden,
College Savings Bank, Florida Prepaid, Kimel, and Morrison. In Boerne, by contrast,
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Thomas, Scalia, Stevens, and Ginsberg joined in
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion (although Justice Scalia declined to join in one non-
determinative subsection), while Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer each wrote
separate dissents. Justice O'Connor, however, in her Boerne dissent, is careful to note that
she agrees with the majority's interpretation of the scope of Congress' Fourteenth
Amendment powers, Boerne, 521 U.S. at 544, and only dissents because of her
disagreement with the Court's interpretation of the First Amendment's free exercise
clause. 521 U.S. at 544-45. Only Justice Breyer raises express reservations concerning the
majority's reading of Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 566 (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
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have to do so without much support from the Court's other four
members. '
On closer examination, however, it is far from clear that these
five justices represent a stable bloc, working from shared assumptions
and objectives. In fact, it appears more likely that two quite different
sets of concerns are motivating various members of the group to join
together in what may well prove to be an unstable coalition. 6 The
primary concern of two members of the majority, Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy, is the protection and restoration of the authority of the
states as autonomous sovereigns. For the others, the primary concern
instead appears to be the delimitation of the scope of federal, and
particularly congressional, regulatory authority. Although these two
concerns have found common ground in the recent series of
federalism decisions, further expansions of the approaches developed
by the Court in these cases are likely to reveal tensions that may
fracture the coalition.
Signs of a fissure were already visible in Lopez. Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion for the majority focused almost entirely on the
limited scope of congressional authority over economic activity under
the Commerce Clause, with only a passing reference to the potential
impact of congressional overreaching on "areas... where States
255. Each of the four, aside from Justice Ginsberg, has written forceful dissents
articulating his disagreements with several of the strands of the Court's new federalism.
See, e.g., Kimel, 528 U.S. at 92 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting); Alden, 527 U.S. at
760 (Souter, J., dissenting); Seminole, 517 U.S. at 58 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 102
(Souter, J., dissenting); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 602 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 604 (Souter,
J., dissenting); id. at 625 (Breyer, J., dissenting). While Justices Stevens and Ginsberg
joined Justice Kennedy's opinion in Boerne, that decision rested heavily on RFRA' s
direct contradiction of the Court's own recent interpretation of the First Amendment.
Their concurrence probably should not be construed to commit them to a newly restrictive
view of congressional authority under the Fourteenth Amendment, but only to a
particular application of the pre-existing framework for Section Five issues, as is
confirmed by their role as dissenters in Kimel.
256. This analysis assumes, of course, that these justices will attempt to decide future
cases on the basis of consistent and principled views about the proper roles of state and
federal authority. The recent opinions endorsed by the five justice majority in Bush v.
Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000), raise serious doubts about this premise. Indeed, in Bush v.
Gore, these five Justices showed themselves ready to radically depart from their
established approaches to central issues concerning state autonomy, in order to reach a
result of particular immediacy. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that, even in Bush v. Gore,
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy declined to join the portion of the majority's argument
that most frontally assaulted state authority by dramatically widening the range of
circumstances under which the Court would reserve the right to second-guess state court
rulings on questions of state law. See id. at 533 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring, joined by
Scalia and Thomas, J.J.).
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historically have been sovereign." 7  Justice Kennedy, joined by
Justice O'Connor, while concurring in what he characterized as the
case's "limited holding,""5 wrote separately to highlight the centrality
of federalism to the Court's role and to emphasize that his decisive
concern was "whether the exercise of national power seeks to intrude
upon an area of traditional state concern." 9
Although it was Justice Kennedy who authored the concurrence
in Lopez,2 it is Justice O'Connor who has long been the Court's most
outspoken advocate for state autonomy.61 Her dissent in Garcia is a
forceful defense of the proposition that "the States as States have
legitimate interests which the National Government is bound to
respect even though its laws are supreme."2"2  In a series of
subsequent opinions,63 she guarded the embers of Usery's federalism,
until she could fan them back into flame in New York. Throughout,
she has been the primary reviver of the Court's nineteenth-century
federalism case law""4 and the leading proponent of a separate spheres
vision of federalism.
265
For both Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy, their solicitude
for the constitutional prerogatives of the states reflects their
professional experience before they joined the Court. Justice
O'Connor spent virtually her entire career, before her appointment to
257. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
258. Id. at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
259. Id. at 580.
260. Justice Kennedy's concurrence draws heavily on Justice O'Connor's opinions for
its federalism themes. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576-577 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft,
507 U.S. 452 (1991); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); FERC v. Mississippi,
456 U.S. 742,777 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
261. See M. David Gelfand & Keith Werhan, Federalism and Separation of Powers on
a "Conservative" Court: Currents and Cross-Currents from Justices O'Connor and Scalia,
64 TUL. L. Rev. 1443, 1449 (1990).
262. 469 U.S. at 581 (emphasis in original).
263. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 530 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
264. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 156, 162 (citing Lane County v.
Oregon, 74 U.S. 71 (1869) and Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700 (1869)); FERC v. Mississippi,
456 U.S. 742, 777-78 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting) (same); Kimel, 528
U.S. at 72-73 (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)); cf. Sandra Day O'Connor, Our
Judicial Federalism, 35 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1, 2 (1984) (quoting United States v.
Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 53 (1937) for the phrase "our 'indestructible union of indestructible
states'," which derives from Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1868)). See stipra text
accompanying notes 78-82.
265. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. at 458; Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580-81: FERC,
456 U.S. at 777-78.
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the Supreme Court in 1981, working in county and state government,
first in California and then in Arizona. In the course of her career,
she served in all three branches of state government, first as a county
attorney and assistant attorney general, then as a state senator, and
finally as a judge on the Arizona superior and appellate courts.2
Justice Kennedy's career, before his appointment to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in 1975, was spent in his family's law firm in
Sacramento, where his practice emphasized lobbying California state
government on behalf of business clients and also allowed him time to
advise then-Governor Ronald Reagan on state fiscal policy. 7
The other three members of the Court's majority, by contrast,
arrived at the Court after careers that included significant roles in
Republican administrations in Washington," and their approaches to
federalism issues often reflect the concerns about congressional
overreaching that this background instilled. The dominant message
that comes through their opinions in the federalism cases is the need
to constrain federal regulation, and particularly congressional action,
within the bounds of the Constitution's express authorizations."
Even when Justice Scalia, for example, presents an extended
explanation of the principles of federalism in Printz, his focus is on
the need to limit federal power, not the values of preserving state
266. See Judith Olans Brown, Wendy E. Parmet, & Mary E. O'Connell, The Rugged
Feminism of Sandra Day O'Connor, 32 IND. L. REv. 1219, 1220-23 (1999); Gelfand &
Werhan, supra note 261, at 1448-49.
267. See Aaron Freiwald, Portrait of the Nominee as a Young Man: As Lobbyist and
Lawyer, Anthony Kennedy Thrived in Reagan's California, LEGAL TIMEs, Nov. 23, 1987,
at 1.
268. Chief Justice Rehnquist, before his appointment to the Court in 1971, spent two
years as assistant attorney general for the Office of Legal Counsel under President Nixon,
defending the prerogatives of the executive branch. See SUE DAvIs, JusTIcE REHNQUIST
AND THE CONsTrruTION 67 (1989). Justice Scalia spent six years as an assistant attorney
general in the Nixon and Ford administrations, including a time heading the Office of
Legal Counsel, before his appointment to the Court of Appeals in 1982. Gelfand &
Werhan, supra note 261, at 1447 and n.13; Robert Marguard, High Court's Colorful Man
in Black, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, March 3,1998. Justice Thomas served briefly as
a legislative assistant to Sen. John Danforth, then joined the Reagan administration, first
as assistant secretary in the Department of Education and then as director of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, where he served for eight years, before his
appointment to the Court of Appeals. See
<http://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/bwoodhou/vsc/Thomas 03.htm>.
269. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556-57 (focusing on the need to constrain
congressional power under the Commerce Clause ); id, at 593 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(similar); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59-68 (focusing on the limits on Congress' power to
abrogate sovereign immunity); Printz, 521 U.S. at 936 (Thomas, J., writing "separately to
emphasize that the Tenth Amendment affirms the undeniable notion that under our
Constitution, the federal government is one of enumerated, hence limited, powers").
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autonomy.'7 Whereas Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Alden
focuses on the centrality of state sovereignty to the federal design,21
the majority opinions by Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist in
Alden's two companion cases instead focus on the constitutional
limits on congressional authority.2' Indeed, for Justices Scalia and
Thomas, if not for Chief Justice Rehnquist, one could easily conclude
that their commitment to federalism principles is nothing more than a
corollary of their deeper interest in restraining governmental power.'
Often the different concerns that appear to motivate these two
clusters of justices point in the same direction, toward restrictions on
congressional enactments which intrude on state authority or
autonomy. But, even when their interests coincide, the tensions
remain, as is evidenced by the strains among the opinions of the
majority justices in Lopez and by the divergent approaches in the
Court's opinions in Alden and its companions.
The Court's recent decision in United States v. Morrison shows
signs of a careful effort by the Chief Justice to smooth over these
differences and preserve the coalition. Throughout his majority
opinion's discussion of the Commerce Clause, the Chief Justice is
careful to draw extensively from Justice Kennedy's Lopez
concurrence, emphasizing the limited nature of the Court's incursion
270. Printz, 521 U.S. at 918-22. For Justice Scalia, the ultimate argument for
precluding federal authority to commandeer the efforts of state law enforcement officers is
that "[t]he power of the Federal Government would be augmented immeasurably if it
were able to impress into its service at no cost to itself the police officers of the fifty
States." IdL at 922. He finds it necessary to supplement even this argument with a
discussion of the implications of such commandeering for the proper distribution of
authority internal to the branches of the federal government. Id. at 922-24.
271. 527 U.S. at 713-20.
272. See College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 690 (Justice Scalia emphasizing core notion
of federalism that "governmental power ... had to be dispersed and countered"); Florida
Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 638-39 (Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasizing that Congress' power is
limited to enforcing rights and does not extend to determining constitutional \ ioIations).
273. See, e.g., Stewart Baker & Katherine Wheatley, Justice Scalia and Federalism: A
Sketch, 20 URB. LAw. 353 (1988) ("Justice Scalia is emerging as at best, an occasional-
perhaps only an accidental-advocate of federalism."); Gelfand & Werhan. supra note
261, at 1456 (characterizing Justice Scalia's approach as "Federalism as a Byproduct").
Justice Thomas, before his appointment to the Court, has gone so far as to characterize
"states' rights" as a "constitutional sideshow." Clarence Thomas, An Afro-American
Perspective: Toward a "Plain Reading" of the Constitution - The Declaration of
Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 How. L.J 983 (1987). By contrast,
federalism appears to play a far more significant role for Chief Justice Rehnquist. See,
e.g., DAVIS, supra note 268 (arguing that Rehnquist "places a preeminent value on
federalism"); David L. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 293, 294 (1976) (identifying federalism as one of three ideological underpinnings of
Rehnquist's jurisprudence).
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on congressional authority.274 And he repeatedly rests his Commerce
Clause analysis on the necessity of protecting areas of traditional state
authority from federal intrusion, 5 the theme that had been central
for Justice Kennedy's concurrence, far more than for the majority
opinion, in Lopez. Similarly, in addressing the Fourteenth
Amendment issue, Chief Justice Rehnquist's decision to focus on
state action, rather than on the Boerne/Kimel distinction between
rights and remedies serves to avoid a confrontation with Justice
O'Connor, who, in Kimel, had carefully protected congressional
actions predicated on "race and gender" from the same scrutiny
attaching to purportedly remedial measures on behalf of non-suspect
categories.276
Future cases that offer opportunities to expand the Court's
federalism agenda are likely to strain the majority's fragile coalition
further. Justice O'Connor has clearly signaled that she is not
prepared to extend the Court's strict scrutiny of Congress' Fourteenth
Amendment powers to statutes concerned with race and gender.'s
So, when the Court confronts a challenge to enforcement of Title VII
or of VAWA against state agents, the coalition may well fracture. 8
Conversely, Justice O'Connor has already failed to attract
support from the majority's other faction to her efforts to set limits on
Congress' spending power279 and to find substantive protections for
state sovereignty in the Tenth Amendment.m In short, it remains less
than clear how far some members of the coalition are prepared to go
in identifying protected areas of substantive state autonomy, while it
remains equally unclear how far others will go in enforcing narrow
limits on Congress' enumerated powers. These doubts raise grave
questions about how far the Court will be able to advance the project
of its revived separate-spheres federalism.
274. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607-08.
275. See, e.g., id. at 607-09.
276. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 62.
277. See id.
278. Cf. Charles Lane, Disabilities Act Challenge Divides Court, WASH. POST, Oct. 12,
2000, at A15 (describing Justice O'Connor's critical role in oral arguments for Alabama v.
Garrett concerning the Americans with Disabilities Act.).
279. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 213-14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy had not
yet joined the Court, and Justice O'Connor dissented alone, although Justice Brennan also
dissented on Twenty-First Amendment grounds.
280. See Baker, 485 U.S. at 533-34 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Again, Justice
O'Connor dissented alone. Justice Kennedy took no part in the case.
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B. Deconstructing the Court's Nostalgia
It is not our purpose to revisit the endless debates about different
theories of federalism or the competing virtues of state-centered
versus national federalism visions.81 Rather, our project is to explore
the ramifications of the Court's nostalgic return to a separate spheres
image of government structure and to suggest that its imagery cannot
sustain its jurisprudence. In fact, the underlying metaphor is neither
historically sound nor workable in today's world.
Despite the Court's obeisance at the altar of the past, its
federalism decisions are essentially ahistoric: the concept of separate
spheres was as ephemeral in the nineteenth century as it will be in
the twenty-first.' In practical terms, the separation was always
artificial; the roles of state and federal governments in regulating, for
example, economic activity were intermingled and controversial from
the start,' as were their modes of raising revenue.' In reality, the
period surrounding the ratification of the Constitution resulted, not in
a simple carving up of the responsibilities of government, but in a
"new synthesis" of the concept of sovereignty.'
Specifically, the Framers reconceived sovereign power as
residing, not in the individual states, but in the "whole body of the
people," who could distribute and redistribute its elements as they
saw fit among different governments and different branches of the
same government.' This understanding sees the distribution of
281. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN L. REv. 317 (1997); H.
Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REv. 633 (1993);
Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41
UCLA. L. REV. 903 (1994); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders'
Design, 54 U. Ci. L. REv. 1484 (1987).
282. See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt, supra note 17, at 1564-66 (noting the outmoded
"territorial" model of separate spheres federalism).
283. See, e.g., Vicki Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and
Principle, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180,2196-97 (1998) (suggesting that the theory of separate
spheres does not prohibit the federal government from imposing requirements on the
states).
284. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Charles River
Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837). See generally FELIX
FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY, AND WAITE
(1934).
285. See Hills, supra note 12, at 851-52.
286. ELKINS & MCKiTRICK, supra note 107, at 12-13. In THE FEDERALIST No. 51,
Madison described the purpose of the complex structural checks and power divisions in
the constitution as controlling factions and preventing usurpations of power. In his words
"the different governments will control each other."
287. ELKINS & McKrrRICK, supra note 107. This characterization is shared by a
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governmental powers as contingent, concurrent and contextual, the
very antithesis of separation into rigid, metaphysical spheres with
conflicting agendas.
If this model was a poor fit for the framing period, it was even
more procrustean after the Civil War when, in fact, the separate
spheres imagery rose to judicial prominence.' Indeed, it is more
than a bit ironic that it was precisely at the time when the national
economy was expanding most rapidly'n and when the constitutional
foundations of state autonomy had been significantly undermined'"
that the Court found it appropriate to promulgate a vision of
federalism that asserted a sacrosanct realm of state authority. When
the contemporary Court harkens back to this vision, its nostalgia is
not for a past reality but for a fantasy past to which it wishes it could
return.
If this fantasy fails to reflect historical reality, it falls even further
short in application to contemporary life. While economics and
politics become ever more global, the Court seeks to revive a
parochial, locally centered, Jeffersonian America. Appealing as that
Rockwellian portrait might be 9 ' the notion that some elements of our
lives can be cut off from national and international regulation simply
does not make sense when we buy our books over the Internet and
trade shares in foreign securities from our bedrooms. The states
cannot function as independent sovereigns when their fiscal fates are
simultaneously utterly interdependent and dependent on the national
and global economy. Family law, long the archetypal province of
state responsibility, no longer respects state boundaries when the
Internal Revenue Code and federal health care legislation are
fundamental influences on family structure.2 The newly-elected
leading anti-federalist historian, see MCDONALD & SHAPIRO MCDONALD, supra note 79,
at 201.
288. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 550-51 (1876) ("[T]here need be no
conflict between... the respective spheres of state and federal government.").
289. For a thorough discussion of the role of the railroads in the emergence of a
national economy in this era, see JEAN STROUSE, MORGAN: AMERICAN FINANCIER 246-
261,319-324,451-53,563-65 (2000).
290. As Professor Tribe explains in analyzing the way the nineteenth century Court
viewed the Reconstruction Amendments, "What the constitution placed in the federal
sphere, it necessarily took from the state sphere." TRIBE, supra note 34, at 1310.
291. For further discussion of that imagery, see Judith Olans Brown & Phyllis Tropper
Baumann, Nostalgia as Constitutional Doctrine: Legalizing Norman Rockwell's America,
15 VT. L. REV. 49 (1990).
292. See Libby Adler, Federalism and Family, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 211
(1999). Cf Ann C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1787, 1820, 1871-
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Republican candidate for the presidency, instead of seeking abolition
of the Federal Department of Education, campaigned on the vital
federal role in public education, another "core" function of state and
local government.293
In such a world, the effort to build a jurisprudence on a mythic
vision of a vanished past is doomed to fail. In fact, the Court's
nostalgia proves unworkable on a number of different levels -
doctrinal, practical, and theoretical - all of which are ultimately
traceable to the perceived need for a rigid categorical framework that
can set sharp boundaries to congressional authority.
We begin, as we must, with the doctrine, because one of the High
Court's most fundamental responsibilities is pedagogy: to teach the
lower federal courts and the legal profession. As with Usery, the
approaches the Court proposes in each branch of its new federalism
rest on constructs and distinctions which have no grounding in reality.
To start with the Commerce Clause, in the wake of Lopez and
Morrison, the limits of federal regulatory power depend on a
distinction between commercial and non-commercial activities.
Traditionalists might suggest that education, for example, falls cleanly
on the non-commercial side of the line.' In a post-agrarian society,
schools are inextricably entangled with commercial life. Their
function is, in large part, to equip students for successful participation
in national, and indeed international, commercial employment.295 The
education industry represents a massive and expanding share of
national economic activity.2 6 Indeed, to a growing extent, schools are
72 (1995) (arguing why family law ought to be an exclusively state concern). The
Morrison Court uses family law as an example of an area of "traditional state regulation"
that must be protected from federal intrusion. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-16.
293. See, e.g., James Dao, Bush Expands on Education Theme, Saying a Reading Crisis
Endangers the Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2000, at A20; Rachel Smolkin, Education
Goes to Head of the Class, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 24, 2000, at Al; Michael
Kinsley, ... And His Wise-Fool Philosophy, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2000, at A25.
294. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-65.
295. See, e.g., Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education
under the U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86
Nw. U. L. REV. 550, 614 (1992) (documenting the economic implications of public
education). Cf Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 371, 384, 400 (N.J. 1990) (focusing on
obligation of public education to prepare each student for his/her role as "a competitor in
the labor market").
296. See Edward Wyatt, Investors See Room For Profit In the Demand for Education,
N.Y. TIMES Nov. 4, 1999, at Al; (education and training accounts for 10% of U.S. gross
domestic product). Cf. National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education
Statistics, 1999, ch. 4, at I (documenting steep growth in federal funding of education from
1965 to 1999) <http:/nces.ed.gov/pubs20001Digest99/chapter4.html>.
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themselves commercial enterprises, with public schools increasingly
challenged to compete with for-profit alternatives.2
The education example is by no means unique. Attempts to
distinguish between commercial and non-commercial activity in the
First Amendment context have proven increasingly ephemeral,298 and
it is hard to imagine an area of modem life that is not entwined with
or significantly impacted by the world of commerce. To belabor the
obvious, if every potential topic of regulation is interconnected with
commercial activity, then the Court's purported doctrine can only
limit federal authority by pretending not to see connections that are
obvious to all. The possible rejoinder that just because something is
intertwined with commerce does not mean that it is commerce would
rest constitutional consequences on an inscrutable metaphysics.' M
The distinctions at the heart of the Court's Section Five
jurisprudence are equally specious. Insofar as Boerne is about
federalism, not about which branch of the federal government has
authority to interpret the First Amendment,' it depends on a
297. See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, New York to Seek Private Managers for Worst Schools,
N.Y. TIMEs July 27, 2000, at Al; Jerry Ackerman, Cyberspace U, BOST. GLOBE, Aug. 25,
2000, at Fl; Jay Mathews, New School of Thought: Making Education Pay, For-Profit
Initiative Has Backing, WASH. POST, Apr. 19,2000, at El.
298. Consider, for example, the Court's difficulty in applying its definition of
commercial speech, where what is determinative is the content of the speech and not the
speaker's profit motivation. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,758 (1976). Compare Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433
U.S. 350 (1977), with Florida Bar v. Went For It, 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (lawyer advertising);
also compare Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S.
328 (1986) with Greater New Orleans Broad. Assoc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999)
(casino gambling).
299. The commercial/noncommercial distinction is particularly elusive in Reno v.
Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000). The Court's brief assertion that the personal information
regulated by the Driver's Privacy Protection Act is a "thing in interstate commerce," idL at
148, reminds us that virtually anything government touches can easily take on a
commercial aspect. Although the commercial/non-commercial distinction may be no
easier to make in the sovereign immunity context, it is a distinction with increasing appeal
in that context in the wake of College Savings Bank, where Justice Breyer argued in
dissent that a state should be subject to suit when it "engages in ordinary commercial
ventures.., like a private person." 527 U.S. at 694-95 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also
William A. Fletcher, The Eleventh Amendment: Unfinished Business, 75 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 843, 855 (2000) ("The distinction between sovereign actions and commercial actions
turns out to be critical to Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence .. ").
300. Notwithstanding the Court's separation of powers rhetoric, see Boerne, 521 U.S.
at 535-36, Boerne leaves the scope of Congress' remedial power in the religious liberty
context unclear. Although RFRA no longer constrains state laws burdening the exercise
of religion, it appears to remain a viable constraint on conflicting federal law. Thus, in
Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that, notwithstanding Boerne, RFRA protects an insolvent religious donor
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dichotomy not unlike Lopez's. In defining the scope of congressional
authority to regulate behavior under the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court's Section Five strategy is to circumscribe the sphere of
constitutional rights, just as in Lopez the strategy was to delimit the
sphere of commerce."' The difficulty here is not that the crucial
boundary is anachronistic, but that it is simply unintelligible. After
all, the very ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment posed a
fundamental challenge to the separate-spheres vision, a fact that the
nineteenth-century Court obscured by a host of interpretive
manipulations that narrowed the amendment's impact.' A century
later, the Boerne and Morrison Courts continue in pursuit of the same
fruitless task.
Even more evanescent is the fence the Boerne Court attempts to
erect between rights and remedies. The fiction of pure right
abstractions separated from fact specific and practical remedies is
simplistic and artificially acontextual 3" Neither legislatures nor
courts can realistically understand rights without reference to the
remedies by which those rights are to be vindicated. Nor should they.
Identifying a set of rights to remediate without considering the impact
of the remedy on the scope of the right is an empty exercise. In fact,
the Court itself often invokes remedial issues to define and delimit
constitutional rights."
and his church from the generally applicable fraudulent conveyance provisions of the
United States Bankruptcy Code. 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996), vacated and remanded, 521
U.S. 1114 (1997), affd, 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 811 (1998). See
also Jonathan C. Lipson, On Balance: Religious Liberty and Third-Party Harms, 84 MINN.
L. REV. 589,650-57 (2000) (discussing Young).
301. See, e.g., Kimel, 528 U.S. at 85-86 (circumscribing the range of rights against age
discrimination); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533-36 (circumscribing the range of rights against state
infringements on religious freedom).
302. See The Slaughterhouse Cases, 183 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (limiting the
Privileges and Immunities Clause to the privileges and immunities of state, not national,
citizenship ), and the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (requiring state action to violate
Section One, thus holding that Congress may not reach private behavior under Section
Five).
303. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999).
304. The school desegregation cases are illustrative. After describing plaintiff's right
to a unitary school system in Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 439-42 (1968)
the Court narrowed the right in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,
26 (1971) to a right to maximum practicable desegregation.
The evanescence of the right/remedy separation becomes even more evident when we
consider the libertarian basis of rights in our constitutional regime. Rights are not
affirmative entitlements but only negative limitations on government. See Judith Olans
Brown, Wendy E. Parmet & Phyllis Tropper Baumann, The Failure of Gender Equality:
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Although perhaps overwrought, the Boerne Court's frustration
and its distaste for Congress' confrontational RFRA tactics is
certainly understandable. However, less easy to grasp, particularly
after Kimel and Morrison, is the specific doctrinal catapult used to
reassert its constitutional primacy. While Boerne's concern that
Congress had redefined the scope of First Amendment rights is
intelligible, the Court's efforts in Kimel to explicate why Congress'
definitions of the parameters of age discrimination overreached the
right/remedy boundary are far more mysterious. Equally opaque,
particularly in light of the massive record of state acknowledged
failure to remedy violence against women and the overwhelming state
support for a federal remedy, is the Morrison Court's insistence that
VAWA was constitutionally deficient because it was directed at
private actors and thus threatened state sovereignty.f 5 The Court
seems to have forgotten Usery's lesson that doctrine predicated on
contrived and irrational distinctions will be short lived.
The doctrinal distinctions required to make sense of the Court's
new sovereign immunity jurisprudence are no less problematic.
Indeed, it is in this area that the Court finds itself thrown back to the
very conceptual difficulties that scuttled the Usery approach some
fifteen years ago, difficulties that revolve around the elusive concept
of a core sphere of state sovereignty.' 6
The logic of the Court's opinions in Alden and its companions
hinges on the notion that states, when acting in their sovereign
capacity, cannot be subjected to judicial interference without their
consent, except where the Constitution expressly provides for such
An Essay in Constitutional Dissonance, 36 BUFF. L. REv. 573, 618-19 (1987). This narrow
laissez-faire approach denies any social responsibility to provide services or facilitate
claims and thus further obviates any meaningful jurisprudential boundaries between rights
and remedies.
305. Even the majority concedes the "voluminous" congressional record. Morrison,
529 U.S. at 619-20. See also id. at 652-54 (Souter, J., dissenting) (reviewing record of state
support for VAWA). As Justice Souter notes, "the states will be forced to enjoy the new
federalism whether they want it or not." Id. at 654.
306. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 545-46.
"There is not and there cannot be, any unchanging line of demarcation between
the essential and non-essential governmental functions. Many governmental
functions of today have at some time in the past been nongovernmental. The
genius of our government provides that, within the sphere of constitutional
action, the people - acting not through the courts but through their elected
legislative representatives - have the power to determine as conditions demand,
what services and functions the public welfare requires."
Id at 546 (quoting Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. at 427).
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interference." And the same (il)logic underlies Reno v. Condon,
holding that the Commerce Clause permits regulation of state sales of
motor vehicle information makes sense only in terms of the ancient
proprietary/governmental dichotomy, which postulated a different
legal status for states when exercising their sovereign powers than
when performing more quotidian functions.' In Condon, the Court's
only rationale for upholding Congress' restrictions is that they
regulate the states not "in their sovereign capacities," but as "owners
of databases," a distinction only comprehensible to someone for
whom the proprietary/governmental distinction comes naturally."
And, if sales of databases fall on the proprietary side of the line, why
do infringements of patents lie on the sovereign side?31
In an era when public and private functions have thoroughly
interpenetrated one another,311 the Court, in trying to make sense of
these contrasts, will be left with the unpalatable choice between an
empty formalism that simply shelters all activities undertaken by a
state and a hopeless endeavor that seeks to carve out a meaningful
concept of core state sovereignty. The latter project is the one that
failed in the National League of Cities debacle. The former approach
suffers from not only its wooden irrationality, but also a serious
disconnection from the historical precedent on which it purports to
rest - the pre-constitutional world in which states supposedly played a
circumscribed set of sovereign roles. It is questionable, at best,
whether such an unprincipled boundary can long survive, particularly
when it needs to justify such important decisions as whether to
307. 527 U.S. at 706.
308. See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1059,
1099-1113 (1980) (explaining the rise of the nineteenth century distinctions bet-x cen public
and private corporations and between the governmental and proprietary rules of public
corporations). One remaining, if ironic, vestige of the governmentalfproprietary
distinction is the Dormant Commerce Clause's "market participant exception," which
shelters the proprietary activities of state and local governments from the scrutiny to
which the Dormant Commerce Clause ordinarily subjects them. See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v.
Stake, 447 U.S. 429,446-47 (1980); White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers,
460 U.S. 204, 206 (1983); see generally Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant
Exemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REv. 395 (1989).
309. Condon, 528 U.S. at 151.
310. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 636 (1999). The House of Representatives recently heard testimony urging the
restoration to intellectual property owners of the right to sue states for infringement.
Witnesses discussed the unfairness of the windfall to states shielded from infringement
liability as well as arguing that states participating in the intellectual property system were
acting in a proprietary and not a governmental way. 69 U.S.L.W. 2072 (Aug. 8, 2000).
311. This was the central problem for the cases applying Usery. See supra note 83.
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restrict the rights of public employees to enforce their rights to
reasonable working conditions or to equitable treatment.
312
Of course, despite these difficulties, the Court may, by judicial
fiat and without concern for the conceptual puzzles it is posing for
Congress, the states, and the lower courts, insist on the reality of
these critical categorical distinctions - between commerce and non-
commercial activity, between rights and remedies, between public and
private. However, if it does so, the resulting allocation of authority
appears fated to prove, not only "unsound in principle," but
"unworkable in practice. 3 13
Consider, first, the impact of the Court's sovereign immunity
doctrine on congressional regulatory capacity. What will become, for
example, of such an explicitly and quintessentially congressional role
as the regulation of patents,31 4 if the states are truly immune from
judicial remedies and if the boundaries of state sovereignty are left to
state self-definition? What prevents a state, concerned about the high
costs of prescription drugs, from simply deciding to manufacture and
market the drugs itself without any royalties to the patent holders?
35
Once states have learned to circumvent patent protections in this
manner, will those protections retain any significant value for the
patent holders that cannot be expropriated at will by state action?
The Court may conceive of its sovereign immunity cases as simply
sheltering the states from the ordinary application of congressional
enactments, 316 but, in practice, the states' immunity threatens a far
broader evisceration of congressional authority. 7
312. These stresses on the Court's boundary will be further aggravated both by the
proliferation of quasi-governmental entities, such as industrial financing agencies and port
authorities, lurking at the borders of state sovereignty, and by the Court's attempt to
exclude local entities from sovereign immunity's protection, despite the infinitely
malleable variety of blendings of state and local roles.
313. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546-47.
314. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("Congress shall have the Power... to promote the
Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and Discoveries.").
315. For that matter, could a state establish or authorize a separate, quasi-
governmental entity to do so on its behalf?
316. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 758 ("When Congress legislates in matters affecting the
States, it may not treat these sovereign entities as mere prefectures or corporations ...
Congress has ample means to ensure compliance with valid federal laws, but it must
respect the sovereignty of the States.").
317. Of course, the evisceration could be sharply restricted if a dependable distinction
could be drawn between the core governmental or public functions that are protected by
sovereign immunity and the peripheral proprietary or private functions that are not. This
is precisely the kind of conceptual distinction that the Court previously tried and failed to
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Conversely, the Court's nostalgic federalism places a regulatory
responsibility on the states that they are, in practicality, incapable of
assuming.31 Perhaps in an earlier time, when the web of economic
interdependency was looser, and when the mobility of people,
economic activity, and capital was more constrained, states could
realistically be expected to make independent choices about whether
and how they would regulate in areas of environmental, social or
criminal conduct that impinge on, but do not directly affect,
commercial activity. At present, however, states often are poorly
positioned to exercise meaningful authority over actors and events
that easily migrate across state boundaries. 19 And even when they
might be able to regulate effectively, the states, cognizant of their
precarious place in an increasingly competitive national and global
economy, are often understandably reluctant to impose costs or
burdens that might impair their competitive position."0  In
consequence, the Court's federalism threatens, not to shift regulatory
power to the states, but to create a regulatory vacuum that neither
Congress nor the states can fill.321 Moreover, the Court's deployment
of a set of unstable doctrinal distinctions will, in practice, invite both
Congress and the states to manipulate the Court's categories in ways
draw during the Usery era.
Alternatively, congressional authority could be sustained by reliance, not on
private enforcement actions, which are barred by sovereign immunity, but on federal
agency enforcement actions, which are not. See supra text accompanying note 187. But
the availability of such a strategy reduces Alden's purportedly substantive protection of
state sovereignty to an ironic formalism that adds little or nothing to state autonomy while
exacerbating the state/federal friction that the Court claims to diminish. Cf. Solid Waste
Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corp. of Engineers, 121 S. Ct. 675
(2001).
318. Beyond the inappropriateness of the shift of regulatory responsibilities,
conditioning an individual's constitutional rights on her status as a citizen of a particular
state (as the Court's recent Fourteenth Amendment cases seem to suggest) mocks the
notion of a national polity protected by Article Four, Section Two, and distorts the
constitutional consequences of the incorporation doctrine, applying the guarantees in the
Bill of Rights against state as well as federal infringement.
319. See, e.g., Robyn Shields, Can the Feds Put Deadbeat Parents in Jail?: A Look at the
Constitutionality of the Child Support Recovery Act, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1409, 1439 (1997)
(noting the serious problem of deadbeat parents fleeing across state lines).
320. Cf. Peter D. Emich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause
Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 378, 389-97 (1996)
(discussing the political pressures leading states to offer tax incentives to attract
businesses); see Clayton P. Gillette, Business Incentives, Interstate Competition, and the
Commerce Clause, 82 MINN L. REV. 447 (1997) (arguing that such state practices are
economically rational).
321. This consequence, of course, may be quite compatible with the objectives of one
contingent of the Court's majority.
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that may serve their own ends but will accentuate the incoherence of
the Court's vision. For example, the boundaries of the Court's new
sovereign immunity jurisprudence will encourage states both to
redefine the distribution of responsibilities between state and local
entities and to consider assuming formerly private functions that can
now be more successfully pursued by a state entity immune from
judicial interference. At the same time, Congress is likely to seek
Spending Clause hooks upon which to hang a revived capacity to
impose enforceable federal requirements on the states.'
The doctrinal and practical problems that promise to plague the
Court's new federalism reflect its underlying theoretical incoherence.
The Court's doctrinal ambitions are dependent on a set of boundaries
that appear intellectually untenable, and the Court's defense - that
these demarcations are constitutionally mandated - is little more than
arid scholasticism. Let us be clear. The notion of preserving state
sovereignty in a federally centered regime is not without appeal and
the ongoing task of crafting and guarding a constitutionally
meaningful role for the states is appropriate for the High Court.
However, far less defensible is the methodology the Court employs to
accomplish this task, one which is far too metaphysical and far too out
of touch with current realities to serve as a basis for resolving real
disputes between real parties or for allocating authority among
complex institutional structures and prerogatives.
Consider, for example, the havoc the Court wreaks with the
public/private distinction, a dichotomy that currently plays a variety
of roles in a variety of doctrinal contexts. In the sovereign immunity
cases, the Court, in its effort to protect states from liability, carves a
deep gulf between state actors and the private sector, a gulf that
depends on what the Court sees as the fundamentally distinctive
322. Similarly, Congress is already displaying its ingenuity in relation to the Court's
new Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment standards. A successor to RFRA,
entitled the Religious Liberties Protection Act ("RLPA"), which restores many of
RFRA's restrictions, but rests them on a Commerce Clause foundation, was the subject of
favorable congressional hearings during the 1999 session. See 68 U.S.L.W. 2157 (Sept. 21,
1999) (describing hearings on RLPA). Also, subsequent to the decision in Lopez,
Congress, on September 30, 1996, enacted 18 U.S.C. sect. 922(q)(1 ), articulating several
legislative findings concerning the effects of guns in school zones on interstate commerce,
with the intent of buttressing the provision of the Gun Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C.
sect. 922(q)(2) struck down by the Court. Unless the Court is prepared to engage in an
ongoing cat-and-mouse interchange, in which it repeatedly seeks to refine formulations
that Congress cannot evade, its recent case law may leave nothing more than an
increasingly irrelevant often internally contradictory corpus of technical rules that
Congress can readily sidestep, or not, as the case may be.
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character of sovereignty. In its rush to enfold itself in the seductive
embrace of state sovereignty, the Alden and Kimel Courts must draw
a sharp, if bizarre, distinction between the rights of otherwise
similarly situated employees, depending solely on the Court's
categorization of their employers. Ironically, in its efforts to sanctify
the states, the Court commits itself to a framework that sacrifices the
rights of the agents who carry out the states' functions.
Alden and Kimel are repugnant to other applications of the
public/private distinction as well. For example, at the core of the
Fourteenth Amendment state action doctrine is the notion that the
state is bound by constitutional command, while the regulation of
private entities is rarely of constitutional magnitude. Thus, those
challenging governmental behavior rising to the level of state action
have an additional and more magnificent set of rights than those
whose claims depend on legislative grace, whereas in the sovereign
immunity cases the opposite is true.
The Morrison Court also relies on the distinction between public
and private actors, but ironically uses it to undergird a result
contradictory to the sovereign immunity cases. Morrison denies
congressional ability to reach private behavior under Section Five,' "
thus implying that a VAWA remedy against a state actor might be
within the federal legislative purview.' That leaves the Commerce
Clause as the primary source of authority for regulation of the private
sector. Since VAWA was insufficiently economic to satisfy Lopez,
victims of gender motivated violence are left to the tender mercies of
the very states who have already admitted their inability to deal with
the problem. Morrison thus accomplishes the ultimate disaggregation
of right from remedy which so concerned the Boerne Court.
Separating the world into spheres of purely public and purely
private activity may well have reflected the reality of the framing
period,3' but that reality was surely transformed by Reconstruction
323. 529 U.S. at 621-22.
324. Of course, substantial questions remain about whether such a remedy could pass
muster under Alden and Kimel
325. Of course, there is room for substantial doubt about the viability of a neat
public/private distinction even during the framing period, a time when a private university
like Harvard received special recognition in the Massachusetts Constitution. see Mass.
Const., Pt. 2, cl. 5, see. 2, when many American cities were organized as private corporate
bodies. See, e.g., Frug, supra note 308, at 1095-1099 (discussing, for example,
Philadelphia), and when mercantile corporations like the East India Companies often
assumed public powers and responsibilities, see, e.g., International Trade: 1614: The East
India Companies, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 25, 1999, at 3. Cf Stephen A. Siegel,
Understanding the Nineteenth'Century Contract Clause: The Role of the Propery-Privilege
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and the Industrial Revolution. The anachronism of the Court's
revival of this sharp separation inevitably unleashes a welter of
contradictions and perplexities. The abstract inflexibility of the
Court's categories precludes the sensitivity to circumstance and
context that rendered the pre-existing constellation of public/private
dualities workable3 6 Similarly anachronistic - and similarly artificial
- are the other central dichotomies on which the Court's new
federalism rests: commercial/non-commercial, rights/remedies,
state/federal.
After all is said and done, then, the foundation of the new
rules-and the seeds of their failure-is little more than the Court's
desperate insistence that things have essences, which must be
judicially ascertained in the face of Congress' apparent inability or
unwillingness to do so. Once discovered and identified, the remaining
judicial task is to ensure that these essences are afforded their full
measure of constitutional respect. Like the Philosopher's Stone, this
process purports to be transformative, somehow achieving the
longed-for end to federal aggrandizement.
A constitutional regime predicated on a metaphysical structure
inevitably invites judicial over-reaching. If the proper limits on
federal authority take the form of conceptual abstractions, then it is
the "apolitical" judiciary that is best situated to discern them. If only
the Supreme Court can intuit the natural boundaries between the
spheres, legislative policy choices must necessarily be subject to
rigorous judicial oversight. A Court convinced of the reality of
fundamental categorical distinctions of course arrogates to itself the
power and duty to enforce them. The result is a Court that acts as
Congress' adversary, rather than its partner, in defining the contours
of federalism."
This quixotic search for categorical essences is a path the Court
has trod before, perhaps most (in)famously in Lochner v. New
Distinction and 'Takings' Clause Jurisprudence, 60 So. CAL. L. REv. 1, 67, n.341 (1986)
(discussing the anomalous character of mercantile corporations in the late 18th century);
Note, Incorporating the Republic: The Corporation in Antebellum Political Culture, 102
HARv. L. REV. 1883, 1889-92 (1989) (discussing the complex views of the role of
corporations prevalent during the framing era).
326. For a particularly disingenuous recent discussion of public and private functions,
in the context of political primaries, see California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567
(2000).
327. Cf Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Congressional Power and
Religious Liberty after City of Boerne v. Flores, 1997 SuP. Cr. REv. 79, 95.
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York.3 s The parallels between the Lochner fallacy and the federalism
cases we have been discussing are striking. Lochner rested on a
theoretical abstraction unsubstantiated by factual reality, legislative
wisdom or contemporaneous scholarship. 9  Lochner looked
backwards nostalgically to a preconstitutional order which never
existed beyond the judicial imagination. In that world, rights and
responsibilities were allocated not by the political process but by a
predestined natural ordering discernible only to the Court. As every
student of the Constitution knows, the Lochner revolution failed. It
failed because of internal analytic inconsistencies and because its
metaphysical imperatives were contradicted by empirical reality. The
ultimate Lochnerian heresy was the Court's denial of the legislative
role and its use of the power it arrogated to itself in the service of an
outdated fantasy. When the fantasy proved unsustainable, the Court
found itself institutionally discredited and largely out of the game of
second-guessing congressional authority, until Usery's attempted
revival.
And here they go again!
328. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). For a lengthy discussion of these points see Judith Olans
Brown, Lucy A. Williams & Phyllis Tropper Baumann, The Mythogenesis of Gender:
Judicial Images of Women in Paid and Unpaid Labor, 6 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 457,467-77
(1996).
329. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The Fourteenth
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statistics."). See Cohen, The
Basis of Contract, 46 HARv. L. REv. 552 (1933) or Llewellyn, The Constitution as an
Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1934).
330. Compare the Lochner Court's claim, 198 U.S. at 58-59, to preserve the right of the
states to regulate the working conditions of miners acknowledged in Holden v. Hardy, 169
U.S. 366 (1896), with the Lopez Court's insistence, 514 U.S. at 559-60, on the continuing
viability of Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) and Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 374 U.S. 241 (1964).
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